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RECENT -CASES
ADJOINING LAN DOWNERS-OVERHANGING BRANCHES-INJUNC-
TION AGAINST MAINTENANCE REFUSED
Plaintiff and defendant were adjoining landowners. Defendant planted
a hedge on her side of the boundary which in time grew 20 feet tall. The
branches from this hedge extended across the boundary line and against
plaintiff's house, causing the walls and sills to decay. Plaintiff filed a bill
in equity seeking a permanent injunction against allowing the branches to
overhang the plaintiff's land and for damages. Held, bill dismissed. Gran-
berry v. Jones, 216 S. W. 2d 721 (Tenn. 1949).
At common law the person on whose land the trunk of a tree was
located owned the tree, even though the roots extended into and the branches
overhung the land of another.1 The owner of the land over which the
branches protruded or the roots penetrated had no right in or title to the
roots, the branches or the products of the tree.2 In case of a tree located
on the boundary line, the better view seems to be that the adjoining landowners
are tenants in common of the tree.3
The adjoining landowner, however, has a right to remove overhanging
branches or protruding roots from trees growing upon his neighbor's land.4
This right is based on the right to abate a private nuisance and not on any
property right in the roots or branches.5 Further, notice need not be given the
adjoining landowner before the roots or branches are severed unless the
actor has encouraged the maintenance of such nuisance.6 This right of
removal extends only to the boundary line and not to the cutting down of
the tree.7 If the actor severs the roots or branches or cuts the tree beyond
1. Lyman v. Hale, 11 Conn. 177, 27 Am. Dec. 728 (1836) ; Wideman v. Faivre, 100
Kan. 102, 163 Pac. 619 (1917); Hoffman v. Armstrong, 46 Barb. 337 (N. Y. 1866),
aft'd, 48 N. Y. 201, 8 Am. Rep. 537 (1872); Cobb v. Western Union Tel. Co., 90 Vt.
342, 98 Atl. 758 (1916); Holder v. Coates, M. & M. 112, 173 Eng. Rep. 1099 (N. P.
1827). See Note, 13 TEMP. L. Q. 370 (1939) ; 11 B. U. L. REv. 588 (1931).
2. Lyman v. Hale, 11 Conn. 177, 27 Am. Dec. 728 (1836); Skinner v. Wilder, 38
Vt. 115, 88 Am. Dec. 645 (1865) ; Mills v. Brooker, [1919] 1 K. B. 555; see Note, 18
A. L. R. 655 (1922).
3. Musch v. Burkhart, 83 Iowa 301, 48 N. W. 1025, 12 L. R. A. 484 (1891) ; Griffin
v. Bixby, 12 N. H. 454, 37 Am. Dec. 225 (1841); Skinner v. Wilder, 38 Vt. 115, 88
Am. Dec. 654 (1865); 1 Amr. JUR., Adjoining Landowners § 58 (1936).
4. Grandona v. Lovdal, 70 Cal. 161, 11 Pac. 623 (1886); Harndon v. Stultz, 124
Iowa 440, 100 N. W. 329 (1904) ; Gostina v. Ryland, 116 Wash. 228, 199 Pac. 298, 18
A. L. R. 650 (1921); Mills v. Brooker, [1919] 1 K. B. 555; Notes, 18 A. L. R. 655
(1922), 76 A. L. R. 1111 (1932); 1 A-i. Jup-, AdjoiningLandowners § 56 (1936).
5. See note 2 supra.
6. Hickey v. Michigan C. R. R., 96 Mich. 498, 55 N. W. 989 (1893) ; Mills v. Brooker,
[1919] 1 K. B. 555. See Note, 18 A. L. R. 655, 659 (1922).
7. Newberry v. Bunda, 137 Mich. 69, 100 N. W. 277 (1904); Wideman v. Faivre,
100 KC', 102, 163 Pac. 619 (1917); Wegener v. Sugarman, 104 N. J. L. 26, 138 At.
699 (1927).
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his boundary he will be liable in an action for damages.8 This is true even
though the tree on his neighbor's land shades his property, cuts off light
.and air, and is generally annoying.9
This right of removal by the aggrieved party is so complete that he
cannot maintain an action for a mandatory injunction to require his neighbor
to remove the protruding branches or roots.'0 The reason for this rule is
well stated in Michalson v. Nuttifig," where it is said: "His remedy is in
his own hands. The common sense of the common law has recognized that
it is wiser to leave the individual to protect himself, if harm results to him
from this exercise of another's right to use his property in a reasonable way,
than to subject that other to the annoyance, and the public to the burden,
-of actions at law, which would be likely to be innumerable and, in many
instances, purely vexatious." The Tennessee court in the instant case adopted
the reasoning of the Michalson case. The court states, however, that the
-dismissal of the action did not prejudice the plaintiff as to recovery of any
.expense she might incur in cutting the overhanging branches or foliage.1 2
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-ZONING BOARD-RIGHT OF BOARD
TO APPEAL FROM ADVERSE DECISION OF LOWER COURT
A -corporation applied to the municipal zoning board for a permit to
construct an outdoor motion picture theater in an area zoned for residences.
The board issued an order granting the zoning variance. Neighboring prop-
-erty owners then obtained certiorari from the district court, naming the
zoning board and the applicant as defendants. The district court set aside the
order and dismissed the suit against the applicant, and the board appealed.
The Court of Civil Appeals dismissed this appeal on the ground that the
board had no appealable interest. Held, reversed. The zoning board, as the
representative of the public interest in the controversy, is a proper party to
8. See note 7 supra.
9. "As against adjoining proprietors, the owner of a lot may plant shade trees upon
it, or cover it with a thick forest, and the injury done to them by the mere shading of the
trees is damnum absque injuirld. It is no violation of their rights." Bliss v. Ball, 99 Mass.
597, 598 (1868). See also Michalson v. Nutting, 275 Mass. 232, 175 N. E. 490 (1931),
11 B. U. L. REv. 588, 16 MINN. L. Rav. 210; cf. Humes v. Mayor of Knoxville, 20 Tenn.
403, 34 Am. Dec. 657 (1839) ; Burton v. Chattanooga, 75 Tenn. 739 (1881).
10. Bliss v. Ball, 99 Mass. 597 (1868); Michalson v. Nutting, 275 Mass. 232, 175
N. E. 490 (1931), 11 B. U. L. REV. 588, 16 MINN. L. REv. 210; Hickey v. Michigan
C. R. R., 96 Mich. 498, 55 N. W. 989 (1893) ; Smith v. Holt, 174 Va. 213, 5 S. E. 2d 492
(1939). Contra: Gostina v. Ryland, 116 Wash. 228, 199 Pac. 298, 18 A. L. R. 650 (1921)
(decided under a nuisance statute). See Notes, 18 A. L. R. 655, 659 (1922), 76 A. L. R.
1111, 1113 (1932), 128 A. L. R. 1221, 1223 (1940).
11. 275 Mass. 232, 175 N. E. 490, 491 (1931).
12. For conflicting cases dealing with damages caused by overhanging branches and
protruding roots, see Notes, 18 A. L. R. 655, 662 (1922), 76 A. L. R. 1111, 1113 (1932),
128 A. L. R. 1221, 1223 (1940). For a survey of the law governing adjoining landowners
and growing trees see Macneil, Growing Lawlessness of Trees, in LEGAL EssAYs XN
TRmuTE To OasmxN Kip MCMURRAY 375 (1935).
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appeal from a judgment vacating its order. Board of Adjustment of City of
Fort Worth v. Stovall, 216 S. W. 2d 171 (Tex. 1949).
As a general rule, an administrative board exercising quasi-judicial
powers has neither a right to appeal nor a right to be heard in an appeal
from a judgment affecting its order.' But where the board demonstrates
that it has a legal interest 2 and is aggrieved,3 or was a necessary party to the
review, 4 it has been allowed to appeal. The majority of the courts have held that
a zoning board is engaged in quasi-judicial functions only, and have denied
its right to appeal. 5
Some courts denying the right in zoning cases have recognized the ex-
istence of a public interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but have
ascribed it to the municipality,6 and have allowed the municipality to appeal
though it was not a party below.7 But in 1940, the case of Rommell v. Walsh I
not only recognized the existence of a public interest in a zoning controversy,
but also held that the zoning board could appeal as the representative of such
interest. This holding was approved and followed in the instant case. 9 When a
variance is granted to prevent "unnecessary hardship" 10 and then is vacated
upon appeal, the applicant can appeal." "Unnecessary hardship," however,
means hardship to the individual and not to the public,12 and there is little
reason for allowing the board to appeal when no particular public interest
is involved in a reversal of its order. On the other hand, where the board
denies a variance, its denial merely leaves in operation the ordinance as passed
1. People ex rel. Breslin v. Lawrence, 107 N. Y. 607, 15 N. E. 187 (1888) (justice of
supreme court appealed); State ex rel. Kempster v. Common Council, 90 Wis. 487,
63 N. W. 751 (1895) (city council); 4 C. J. S., Appeal and Error § 205(d) n. 31 (1937).
2. Moode v. Board of County Comm'rs, 43 Minn. 312, 45 N. W. 435 (1890) (order
of school board setting up a new school district quashed).
3. People ex rel. Burnham v. Jones, 110 N. Y. 509, 18 N. E. 432 (1888) (land com-
missioners issued a patent for certain lands, which was reversed).
4. Cleburne County v. Morton, 69 Ark. 48, 60 S. W. 307 (1900) (county court
judge required by statute to defend its order, received adverse judgment).
& State ex rel. Hurley v. Zoning Board, 198 La. 766, 4 So. 2d 822 (1941) ; Miles v.
McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 199 At. 540, 117 A. L. R. 207 (1938); Appeal of Board of
Adjustment, 313 Pa. 523, 170 At. 867 (1934) (all zoning board cases); 4 C., J. S.
Appeal and Error § 205 (1937). The argument has been advanced that since these
boards are of purely statutory creation, absence of specific provision allowing appeal
negates legislative intent that there should be one. Miles v. McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 199
At. 540, 545 (1938).
6. Mayor and City Council v. Linthicum, 170 Md. 245, 183 At. 531 (1936) (appeal
taken by mayor and city council) ; see Miles v. McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 199 At. 540,
545 (1938).
7. State v. Sarasota County, 118 Fla. 629, 159 So. 797 (1935) ; Roy Newman Cigar
Co. v. Murphy, 2 Tenn. App. 321 (E. S. 1926) ; 4 C. J. S., Appeal and Error § 171 (1937).
8. 127 Conn. 16, 15 A. 2d 6.
9. 216 S. W. 2d at 174.
10. "Unnecessary hardship" is the customary statutory criterion for granting a
variance from the zoning ordinances.
11. This is true even though, as here, suit has been dismissed against him. Ballard
v. Kennedy, 34 Fla. 483, 16 So. 327 (1894); 4 C. J. S., Appeal and Error § 169 n. 44
(1937).
12. TEX. Rsv. Civ. STAT. A-N. art 1011g (1925).
1949 1
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by the city council.' 3 If the variance denied by the board is granted by the
reviewing court, the applicant has neither the desire nor the standing to ap-
peal. 14 Public interest now lies in the enforcement of the ordinance, and the
board should be allowed to appeal as the representative of this interest. 15
Probably, in order to be consistent, the board should be allowed to appeal in
all cases wlhere the reviewing court reverses the board's orler, regardless
of whether the variance was originally granted or denied.
It has been held that where there is ambiguity in the provisions of ap-
peal statutes, the language should be resolved in favor of allowing the ap-
peal,16 and in this light the doctrine of the instant case is correct."7 The simple
solution lies in an express statutory provision allowing appeal by the board.'
8
But in the absence of such provisions, the doctrine of the instant case will
probably be extended to analogous situations involving administrative regu-
lations where there is an appealable public interest in the subject matter and
where the administrative tribunal is the proper representative of that interest.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF RELIGION-STATUTE
OUTLAWING SNAKE-HANDLING
Defendants were convicted of violating a Tennessee statute' which makes
it unlawful for any person to handle poisonous snakes "in such a manner as
to endanger the life or health of any person." All were members of a religious
sect which practiced snake-handling as a form of evangelism. Held, conviction
affirmed. Since defendants' conduct involved grave, immediate danger to life
and health, the statute was not an invalid encroachment upon religious free-
dom under either the Federal or. State Constitutions. Harden v. State, 216
S. W. 2d 708 (Tenn. 1948).
The Fourteenth Amendment by its due process clause guarantees the
free exercise of religion against infringement by state action.2 Within this
guaranty, freedom of religious belief is absolute. Freedom to practice that
13. Ordinarily a variance is granted only as a matter of grace, and the situation
would be highly unusual where it could be demanded as a matter of right. Rubin v.
Board of Directors, 16 Cal. 2d 119, 104 P. 2d 1041 (1940) (zoning); People ex rel.
Fordham Church v. Walsh, 244 N. Y. 280, 155 N. E. 575, 578 (1927) (zoning).
14. He is not aggrieved thereby. Olsen v. Jacklowitz, 74 F. 2d 718 (2d Cir. 1935);
Donovan v. Donovan, 223 Mass. 6, 111 N. E. 607 (1916). But applicant might appeal if
judgment were only partly in his favor. Houchin Sales Co. v. Angert, 11 F. 2d 115 (8th
Cir. 1926); Nashville v. Mason, 11 Tenn. App. 344 (M. S. 1930).
15. There is to date no case under this statute on this point. As to the applicant, lie
can contest only the legality of the board's denial, and that legality will ordinarily be
sustained. San Angelo v. Boehme Bakery, 144 Tex. 281, 190 S. W. 2d 67 (1945).
16. Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. George, 69 F. 2d 871 (3d Cir. 1934) ; Abilene v.
American Surety Co., 73 S. W. 2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
17. Walker, Zoning Law in Texas, 3 S. W. L. J. 50, 73 (1949).
18. Note, 21 B. U. L. REV. 122, 124 (1941).
1. TENN. CODE ANN. § 11412.14 (Williams' Supp. 1947).
2. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 213 (1940).
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belief, however, is subject to regulation for the protection of society.3 But, in
general, no regulation of a religious practice is -valid unless the court regards
it as reasonable under all the circumstances. 4 In determining the reasonableness
of the regulation, the courts ordinarily consider the relative importance of the
respective interests-those restricted and those protected-the extent of the
conflict between them, the degree of regulation attempted, and other possible
means of adjusting the conflict.5
In recent years, when dealing with problems involving those freedoms
specified in the First Amendment, the courts have often applied the "clear
and present danger" doctrine. As applied to freedom of religion, the premise
is that a religious practice may not be restricted unless it involves a clear and
present danger to the interests of other members of society. 6 This doctrine by
no means represents an abandonment of the principle that the regulatio n
must be reasonable. If the practice regulated involves no clear and present
danger, the regulation is unreasonable, hence invalid; if a clear and present
danger is involved, the regulation may or may not be reasonable.7 The prob-
lem remains essentially one of balancing the interests. The effect of the clear
and present danger doctrine is to weight the scales somewhat in favor of- re-
ligious freedom. The normal presumption of the validity of legislative acts
does not apply.8
One difficulty of the doctrine is that the concept of clear and present
danger in application has not been clearly defined. 9 This difficulty does not
complicate the instant case, however. The handling of poisonous snakes in-
3. Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 2. That this distinction is not always clear cut
is demonstrated by lit re Summers, 325 U. S. 561, 65 Sup. Ct. 1307, 89 L. Ed. 1795 (1945).
4. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 64 Sup. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944).
5. In each of the following cases most or all of these factors are considered: Follett
v. Town of McCormick, 321 U. S. 573, 64 Sup. Ct. 717, 88 L. Ed. 938 (1944) ; Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 63 Sup. Ct. 870, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943); Jamison v.
Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 63 Sup. Ct. 669, 87 L. Ed. 869 (1943) ; Jones v. City of Opelika,
316 U. S. 584, 62 Sup. Ct. 1231, 86 L. Ed. 1691 (1942); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U. S. 569, 61 Sup. Ct. 762, 85 L. Ed. 1049 (1941).
6. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 63 Sup. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628
(1943).
7. Compare Kovacs v. Cooper, 69 Sup. Ct. 448 (1949), with Saia v. New York,
334 U. S. 558, 68 Sup. Ct. 1148, 92 L. Ed. 1574 (1948), 2 VAND. L. REv. 113. The cases
involved the same danger-the invasion of privacy by unrestricted use of sound amplifiers
(protected as a form of speech). The cases reach different results, apparently on the
ground that the ordinance in one case was a reasonable regulation, while the ordinance
in the other was not.
8. Kovacs v. Cooper, 69 Sup. Ct. 448 (1949).
9. Compare these various statements of the concept: Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U. S. 296, 308, 60 Sup. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940) ("clear and present danger of
riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat
to public safety, peace, or order") ; Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 639,
63 Sup. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943) ("grave and immediate danger to interests
which the State may lawfully protect") ; Thomas v. Collins, 323, U. S. 516, 530, 65 Sup.
Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430 (1945) ("the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests") ;
Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 263, 62 Sup. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192 (1941) ("the
substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high") ;
Kovacs v. Cooper, 69 Sup. Ct. 448, 451 (1949) ("[a] state or city may prohibit acts or
things reasonably thought to bring evil or harm to its people").
1949 ]
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volves an obvious physical danger to participants and bystanders. Danger
seldom appears in more concrete form. The decision is sustained by authority 0
and seems clearly reasonable.
The case is significant in Tennessee law in that it construes for the first
time that part of the Tennessee Constitution which provides that "no human
authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of
conscience." 11 As construed by the court this provision guarantees absolute
freedom of belief, but does not guarantee absolute freedom to practice that
belief. The court leaves no doubt that society is to be protected "from a prac-
tice, religious or otherwise, which is dangerous to life and health." 12
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR
VOTING, TO "UNDERSTAND AND EXPLAIN" THE CONSTITUTION-
EFFECT OF DISCRIMINATORY ADMINISTRATION AGAINST
NEGROES
Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment against the defendant individually
and as a member of an Alabama board of election registrars, to have declared
unconstitutional an amendment to the Alabama Constitution' which provided,
in effect, that only those persons who could understand and explain any
article of the Federal Constitution to the satisfaction of the board would be
allowed to register. The evidence was found to show that in the administration
of the law, the requirements had been enforced almost exclusively against
negroes. Held, the amendment attempted to grant arbitrary power to the
boards to accept or reject any prospective elector and hence was a denial
of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment, and in its
object and manner of administration it was violative of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. Davis v. Schnell, 72 F. Supp. 872 (S. D. Ala. 1949), aff'd mere., 69
Sup. Ct. 749 (1949).2
10. State v. Massey, 51 S. E. 2d 179 (N. C. 1949), appeal dismissed sub noon. Bunn
v. North Carolina, 17 U. S. L. WmxK 3258 (U. S. Apr. 5, 1949) (snake-handling) ; Law-
son v. Commonwealth,, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S. W. 2d 972 (1942) (snake-handling); ef.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244 (1879) (polygamy); Kirk v.
Commonwealth, 186 Va. 839, 44 S. E. 2d 409 (1947) (religious belief held no defense in
criminal prosecution for death caused by snake-handling).
11. TENN. CONST. Art. 1, § 3. The language of this section would seem a stronger
guaranty of religious freedom than the corresponding language of the Federal Constitu-
tion (U. S. CONST. AMEND. I).
12. 216 S. W. 2d at 711. If the only persons endangered were those participating in
the practice, a more difficult problem would be presented. In the present case defendants
argued that they had taken precautions adequate to protect the audience. The court inti-
mates that this assertion, if established, would be no defense.
1. ALA. CONST. AmEND. 55.
2. The opinion of the Supreme'Court reads as follows: "PER CURIAM: The
judgment is affirmed. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 59 S. Ct. 872, 83 L. Ed. 1281; Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 S. Ct. .1064, 30 L. Ed. 220. Cf. Williams v. Mississippi,
170 U. S. 213, 18 S. Ct. 583, 42 L. Ed. 1012."
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The constitutional amendment here involved represents another in a
series of efforts to restrict voting by negroes without violating the Fourteenth
or Fifteenth Amendments. 3 Most of the recent attempts to reach this result
have been through party primaries, with the states seeking to disassociate
themselves from actions taken by the party. Though there was some vacilla-
tion by the Supreme Court in the early cases, recent decisions have uniformly
held that state action is involved, and the series of cases culminating in
Rice v. Elmore 4 has apparently eliminated this method. These cases are dis-
cussed and analyzed in a discussion of the Rice case in an earlier issue of this
Review.5 The instant case involves resort to another method.
The states have the power to prescribe the qualifications for voting as
long as they do not conflict with the Federal Constitution. 6 Literacy require-
ments have been adopted by a number of states,7 while others by constitu-
tional provision require some degree of interpretation or explanation of the
Federal Constitution.8 A provision of the latter type'was held in Trudeau v.
Barnes 9 not to violate either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. In
that case there was apparently no discriminatory administration.
The decision of the district court in the instant case was clearly to the
effect that the amendment was defective both because of the unrestricted power
given to the boards by its indefinite language and because of the unfairness
of its actual administration. This would mean that the amendment is com-
pletely unconstitutional. But the Supreme Court opinion is not as clear. The
reliance on Yick Wo v. Hopkins 10-the leading case holding that the adminis-
tration of a statute may constitute a deprival of equal protection even though the
statute is constitutional on its face--may possibly indicate that the Court
was concerned only with the administration of the amendment. This conclu-
sion is strengthened by the additional reference to Williams v. Mississippi,"
3. See generally Note, Negro Disenfranchisentent-A Challenga to the Constitution,
47 COL. L. Rsv. 76 (1947).
4. 165 F. 2d 387 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 875 (1948).
5. 1 VAND. L. RIEv. 645 (1948).
6. See e.g., Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U. S. 277, 283, 58 Sup. Ct. 205, 82 L. Ed. 252
(1937) ; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, 362, 35 Sup. Ct. 926, 59 L. Ed. 1340 (1915);
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 37-38, 13 Sup. Ct. 3, 36 L. Ed. 869 (1892).
7. GA. CoxsT. § 2-704; LA. CoNsT. Art. 8, §,1; MASs.'CoNsT. Art. XXI, § 122;
Miss. CoNsT. Art. 12, § 244; N. C. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 4; OKLA. CONST. Art. III, § 4a;
S. C. CoNsT. Art. 2, § 4; VA. CONST. § 20. That literacy tests for electors are valid see
Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, 366, 35 Sup. Ct. 926, 59 L. Ed. 1340 (1914).
8. E.g., LA. CoNsT. Art. 8, § 1.
9. 65 F. 2d 563 (5th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 659 (1933) ; cf. Williams v.
Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213, 18 Sup. Ct. 583, 42 L. Ed. 1012 (1898) (indictment by grand
jurors who must be electors qualified under "reasonable-interpretation" provision of state
constitution held valid because the provision did not discriminate against negroes on its
face and no discriminatory administration was shown).
10. 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1004, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886) (city ordinance prohibiting
operation of laundries without consent of administrative board, unless in a brick or stone
building, held void under the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution because
discriminatory administration was apparent, without consideration of validity of the
ordinance itself).
11. 170 U. S. 213, 18 Sup. Ct. 583, 42 L. Ed. 1012 (1898).
1949]
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which involved a provision somewhat similar to the Alabama amendment and
which distinguished the Yick Wo case on the ground that no discriminatory,
administration of the statute was shown.' 2
As a result of the opinions by the district court and the Supreme Court in
the instant case, three possible interpretations as to the effect of the state
amendment may be reached: (1) The amendment is unconstitutional on its
face because it gives unrestricted power to control voting rights not governed
by standards sufficiently definite.13 (2) The amendment is unconstitutional
because the motive of disenfranchisement of negroes within the state was so
inextricably bound up in the history of its adoption. (3) The amendment is
not unconstitutional as such, but any administration of it in a discriminatory
fashion, particularl r if directed against negroes, is unconstitutional. It is not
possible to tell with certainty which of these interpretations is the correct one.
Two conclusions from the case do seem warranted: (1) The case does
not indicate that literacy requirements are unconstitutional if they are prop-
erly expressed in the statute and fairly administered. (2) The Supreme Court
will continue to be alert to invalidate any method intended to restrict the
voting rights of negroes, no matter how legitimate it appears on the surface;
"sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination" 14 will be
banned.
CONTRACTS-OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE-EFFECT OF ATTEMPTED
REVOCATION OF UNILATERAL OFFER AFTER PART PERFORMANCE
Defendant appointed plaintiff, a real estate broker, as his exclusive agent
for 90 days to sell certain property and agreed to pay him a commission if
the property were sold during that time by plaintiff, defendant or any other
party. After spending time and money attempting to procure a purchaser,
plaintiff learned that the property had been sold by another agent of de-
fendant. Plaintiff brought suit to recover the commission. Held, that part
performance of the consideration for an offer contemplating a unilateral
contract makes that offer irrevocable. Hutchinson v. Dobson-Bainbridge
Realty Co., 217 S. W. 2d 6 (Tenn. App. M. S. 1946). 1
12. Cf. McGOVNEY, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 171 (Supp. 1946).
13. Cf. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 46 Sup. Ct. 126, 70
L. Ed. 322 (1926) (statute requiring contractor to pay employees "not less than the
current rate of per diem wages in the locality where work is performed" violates the
Fourteenth Amendment because of uncertainty) ; Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91,
65 Sup. Ct. 1031, 89 L. Ed. 1495 (1945) (federal statute making it an offense to "will-
fully deprive one of rights ... secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States").
14. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 275, 59 Sup. Ct. 872, 83 L. Ed. 1281 (1939).
1. Though this case was decided by the Tennessee Court of Appeals on Aug. 31,
1946, the opinion was not pullished until Mar. 8, 1949. In the case of Lazarov v. Nun-
nally, 217 S. W. 2d 11, decided on Jan. 17, 1949, the Tennessee Supreme Court cited the
[ VOL. 2
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There is a split of authority as to whether an offer looking forward to a
unilateral contract may be revoked after part performance.2 According to the
traditional view, an offeror may revoke his offer to a unilateral contract at any
time before the requested act is completed.3 The application of this strictly
logical view has led to rather harsh results in some cases. 4 Consequently, the
courts have attempted.to find a bilateral agreement wherever possible.5 This
approach does not solve all cases, however, because some offers cannot be
interpreted as anything but unilateral in nature. Several commentators have
attempted to find some logical way to hold that an offer of this nature cannot
be revoked. 6 McGovney has suggested that an offer contemplating a uni-
lateral agreement is accomplished by an implied promise to keep the original
offer open for a reasonable time once performance is commenced. 7 This has
received some support.3 Corbin proposes a rule that offers become irrevocable
for a :-easonable time once performance by the offeree has begun.9 The Re-
statement of Contracts sets forth a similar rule,10 expressing the trend towards
the liberal view. These suggestions have been attacked as binding the offeror
instant case with approbation and recommended that the opinion be published. The
two cases were therefore reported together.
2. Holding offer irrevocable: Lyon v. Goss, 19 Cal. 2d 659, 123 P. 2d 11 (1942);
Abbott v. Stephany Poultry Co., 62 A. 2d 243 (Del. 1948) ; Braniff v. Baier, 101 Kan.
117, 165 Pac. 816 (1917) ; Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 116 Me. 399, 102 At. 106 (1917).
Holding offer revocable: Bretz v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. 134 Ohio St. 171, 16
N. E. 2d 272 (1938) (although there is a suggestion that there would be recovery if the
performance were substantial); Kolb v. Bennett Land Co., 74 Miss. 567, 21 So. 233
(1897); Charles E. Quincy & Co. v. Cities Service Co., 156 Misc. 83, 282 N. Y. Supp.
294 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; Flinders v. Hunter, 60 Utah 314, 208 Pac. 526 (1922).
3. 2 MECHEm, AGEN Y § 2452 (2d ed. 1914); 2 PARSONS, CONTRAcTs 520 (1866);
Wormser, The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L. J. 136 (1916).
4. Biggers v. Owen, 79 Ga. 658, 5 S. E. 193 (1888) ; Stensgaard v. Smith, 43 Minn.
11, 44 N. W. 669, 19 Am. St. Rep. 205 (1890); Petterson v. Pattberg, 248 N. Y. 86,
161 N. E. 428 (1928), 7 TENN. L. REV. 207 (1929).
5. S. Blumenthal & Co. v. Bridges, 91 Ark. 212, 120 S. W. 974 (1909); Davis v.
Jacoby, 1 Cal. 2d 370, 34 P. 2d 1026 (1934); Petroleum Research Corp. v. Barnsdall
Refining Corp., 188 Okla. 62, 105 P. 2d 1047 (1940); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 31
(1932).
6. Ashley, Offers Calling for a Consideration Other Than a Counter Promise, 23
HARV. L. REV. 159 (1910) (considers estoppel as a solution) ; Ballantine, Acceptance of
Offers for Unilateral Contracts by Partial Performaitce of Service Requested, 5 MINN.
L. REV. 94 (1921) ("the law imposes the obligation precluding the offeror from arbi-
trarily revoking the offer, after inducing a person to act on the faith of it, because this is
demanded by good faith and common honesty"); Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and
Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L. J. 169 (1917) (suggests that a rule
consistent with justice and policy be formulated and followed) ; McGovney, Irrevocable
Offers, 27 HARv. L. Rnv. 644, 654 (1914) (implied promise to keep offer open).
7. McGovney, supra note 6, at 659.
8. 1 WILLISToN, CoNTRAcTS § 60A (Rev. ed. 1936); Roth v. Moeller, 185 Cal. 415,
197 Pac. 62, 64 (1921).
9. Corbin, supra note 6, at 195.
10. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 45 (1932) : "If an offer for a unilateral contract is
made, and part of the consideration requested in the offer is given or tendered by the
offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a contract, the duty of immediate
performance of which is conditional on the full consideration being given or tendered




but not the offeree. This may be true, but the offeror can always protect him-
self by requiring a return promise."
The instant case definitely places Tennessee in' the group following the
rule adopted by the Restatement. The fact that there are very few decisions
on this point in Tennessee tends to show that the courts have followed other
states in holding agreements bilateral rather than unilateral whenever pos-
sible.12 The old approach has been utilized in the past to some extent,13 yet
there are decisions which have allowed recovery. 14 It should be noted that
the rule expressed in the instant case has been restricted to certain types of
unilateral contracts in some states.' 5 How broadly the Restatement rule will
be applied in Tennessee remains to be seen, but it would seem best to restrict
its application to those situations where an obvious and real injustice would
occur if it were not used.
In his opinion in the instant case Judge Felts said that the "theoretical
difficulties, formidable as they seem, are outweighed by considerations of
practical justice." 16 However, the result reached seems to be both
rational and just. One who makes an offer looking forward to the creation of a
unilateral contract, where time and effort will be needed to render the per-
formance that constitutes acceptance, may reasonably be deemed to promise
that his offer shall be left open while the acceptance is being rendered. Once
the performance is started, the offeror's implied promise is supported and
made contractual by the doctrine of promissory estoppel, summed up in Sec-
11. 1 WILLisoN, CoNmAcrs § 60A n. 3 (Rev. ed. 1936).
12. Farabee-Treadwell Co. v. Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 135 Tenn. 208,
186 S. W. 92 (1916); Fourth Nat. Bank v. Stahlman, 132 Tenn. 367, 178 S. W. 942
(1915).
o13. McFadden v. Crisler, 141 Tenn. 531, 213 S. W. 912 (1919) (exclusive agency
to sell land is revoked upon sale by owner when there was no explicit agreement that
owner could not sell); Charlton & Lewis v. Wood, 58 Tenn. 19 (1872) (real estate
agent was not allowed to recover a commission for the sale of land when the owner
himself sold it even though the purchaser had become interested through the agent's
advertisements); Clayton v. McKinney, 57 Tenn. 72 (1872) (no allowance for work
done on a levee in part performance, of an offer when a flood destroyed the partially
completed levee).
14. Sylvester v. Johnson, 110 Tenn. 392, 75 S. W. 923 (1903) (where a person who
had an exclusive agency to sell land had commenced negotiations with a purchaser to
whom the owner later sold, the agent was allowed his commission) ; Dulaney v. Page
Belting Co., 59 S. W. 1082 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900) (agent to sell chattels was allowed
to recover on a quantum meruit basis when the agency was revoked prior to his making
any sales but after he had expended time and money in the interest of his principal) ;
Woodall y. Foster, 91 Tenn. 195, 18 S. W. 241 (1892) (real estate agent recovered his
commission where he had been urged by the owner of land to seek a quick sale and
had found a purchaser after three days but then learned that the owner had already
sold the property); Bush v. Jones, 2 Tenn. Ch. 190 (1874) (bricklayer was allowed
recovery for value of his work when he did a very poor job whereas the offer had called
for a good job) ; see Curtiss Candy Co. v. Silberman, 45 F. 2d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1930)
(indicated that if injustice and hardship result from revocation, part performance may
in some cases make an offer irrevocable).
15. Note, 33 COL. L. Rav. 463 (1933) (suggestion that there might be a different
law of reward, tender, brokerage, personal service, etc., in the same state even though
the underlying agreement in each is unilateral).16, 217 S. W. 2d at 10.
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tion 90 of the Restaternent.j7 The effect of the part performance by the
offeree then is to give him an option to complete the act required. Therefore
the instant case is supported by reason and by principle, as well as by the
considerations of practical justice.
CRIMINAL LAW-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-CONVICTION OF HIGHER
OFFENSE ON RETRIAL
Defendant was indicted and tried for murder, and convicted of -man-
slaughter. On appeal he obtained a new trial, and on retrial was convicted
of second degree murder. He contends that the conviction of manslaughter in
the first trial amounted to an acquittal of murder in the first or second
degree; hence, trying him for murder at the second trial constituted double
jeopardy. Held, conviction affirmed; when an accused obtains a new trial
on appeal he may be retried under the original indictment, even though
convicted at the earlier trial of a lesser offense than charged, without being
subjected to double jeopardy. State v. Correll, 50 S. E. 2d 717 (N. C. 1948).
The Federal Constitution and the constitutions of at least 43 states
contain a provision to the effect that no person shall, for the same offense,
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.' And where the 'state constitution
is silent on the point, the doctrine has either been enacted by statute or
recognized by the courts as part of the common law.2 In spite of the language
"life or limb," the doctrine is generally applied to all indictable offenses,
including misdemeanors. 3 The great weight of authority in the United States
is to the effect that jeopardy attaches when a trial jury has been impanelled
and sworn,4 or, if there is no jury, at the equivalent in time to the swearing
17. "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or for-
bearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise."
1. E.g., TENN. CoNsT. Art. 1, § 10. Citations of 41 state constitutions are collected
in Note, 16 CORN. L. Q. 201, 202 (1931). Similar provisions are also found in Amc. CoNsT.
Art. II, § 8 and IowA CoNsT. Art. I, § 12.
2. Cbnnecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Vermont appear to
have no express constitutional provision against double jeopardy. However, at least one
of these, Massachusetts, has a statutory prohibition, MASS. ANN. LAWS, c. 263, §§ 7-8A
(1933) ; while another, North Carolina, interprets its constitution as prohibiting double
jeopardy, although the prohibition is not expressly stated. State v. Mansfield, 207 N. C.
233, 176 S. E. 761 (1934). For cases announcing the principle as a part of the common
law, see State v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414 (1829) ; Johnson v. State, 62 A. 2d 249 (Md.
1948) ; State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 Atl. 98 (1934).
3. Clawans v. Rives, 104 F. 2d 240 (D. C. Cir. 1939); People v. Matiasevich, 12
Cal. App. 2d 759, 55 P. 2d 942 (1936) ; State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 Atl. 98 (1934).
4. E.g., McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F. 2d 640 (10th Cir. 1936); McGill v. State, 209
Ark. 85, 189 S. W. 2d 646 (1945); Barbour v. State, 66 Ga. App. 498, 18 S. E.
2d 40 (1941) ; State v. Charles, 183 S. C. 188, 190 S. E. 466 (1937) ; Note, 24 MINN. L.
RaV. 522, 524 (1940).
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of a jury.5 This constitutional guaranty may be waived, and "it is generally
conceded that a person convicted of a crime waives his constitutional protec-
tion against being put twice in jeopardy and may be tried again where a
verdict against him is set aside and a new trial granted on his motion in the
trial court or a conviction is reversed on appeal or error proceedings
instituted by him." 6
But there is a definite dispute as to the extent of this waiver where a
new trial has been obtained by a defendant who was convicted of a lesser
offense than that charged in the indictment. The 32 jurisdictions which have
ruled on this question are evenly divided. One group takes the position that
a person convicted of a lesser offense than the indictment charges cannot,
on a new trial, be prosecuted for the greater offense.7 The reasoning behind
this view is that the "waiver, unless it be expressly of the benefit of the
verdict of acquittal, goes no further than the accused himself extends it
His application for a correction of the verdict is not to be taken as more
extensive than his needs .... The waiver is construed to extend only to the
precise thing concerning which the relief is sought." 8 The other group of
cases holds that conviction of the lesser offense is not a bar to prosecution
for the greater on a new trial.9 These courts feel that in appealing from the
judgment the defendant necessarily appeals from the whole thereof, as
well that which acquits as that which condemns, for the judgment is one
entire thing and is not divisible.
5. Hasse v. State, 8 Ind. App. 488, 36 N. E. 54 (1894) (when the trial begins).;
State v. Yokum, 155 La. 846, 99 So. 621 (1923) (when the first witness is sworn) ; Rosser
v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 1028, 167 S. E. 257 (1933) (after the State has begun to
introduce evidence).
6. 15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law § 426 (1938). Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S, 15,
64 L. Ed. 103, 40 Sup. Ct. 50 (1919) ; Pratt v. United States, 102 F. 2d 275 (D. C. Cir.
1939); Allen v. Commonwealth, 272 Ky. 533, 114 S. W. 2d 757 (1938); People v. Bel-
lows, 281 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. 2d 238 (1939).
7. Hearn v. State, 212 Ark. 360, 205 S. W. 2d 477 (1947) ; McLeod v. State, 128
Fla. 35, 174 So. 466 (1937); State v. Coleman, 226 Iowa 968, 285 N. W. 269 (1939);
State v. Wilson, 172 Ore. 373, 142 P. 2d 680 (1943); Commonwealth v. Flax, 331 Pa.
145, 200 Atl. 632 (1938) ; Reagan v. State, 155 Tenn. 397, 293 S. W. 755 (1927) ; State
v. McLane, 126 W. Va. 219, 27 S. E. 2d 604 (1943) ; see 71 U. S. L. REv. 421, 423 (1937)
(citing earlier cases). While California is in accord with this view [People v. Muhlner,
115 Cal. 303, 47 Pac. 128 (1896)], it makes a unique distinction: a difference in the
degrees of murder is held not to constitute a difference in offenses, and a conviction of
murder in the second degree is therefore held not to bar a conviction, on a new trial, of
murder in the first degree. People v. McNeer, 14 Cal. App. 2d 22, 57 P. 2d 1018 (1936).
See also Hall v. State, 145 Tex. Cr. App. 192, 167 S. W. 2d 532, 533 (1943), holding that
"upon a reversal of a conviction for murder without malice the accused could again be
placed upon trial for murder with malice," even though Texas also adheres to the above
view. Brown v. State, 99 Tex. Cr. App. 19, 267 S. W. 493 (1925).
8. People v. Dowling, 84 N. Y. 478, 484 (1881).
9. Trono v. United States, 199 U. S. 521, 26 Sup. Ct. 121, 50 L. Ed. 292 (1905);
Perdue v. State, 134 Ga. 300, 67 S. E. 810 (1910) ; Christensen v. State, 203 P. 2d 258
(Kan. 1949) ; Hoskins v.Commonwealth, 152 Ky. 805, 154 S. W. 919 (1913) ; Butler v.
State, 177 Miss. 91, 170 So. 148 (1936); Macomber v. State, 137 Neb. 882, 291 N. W.
674 (1940) ; State v. Hiatt, 187 Wash. 226, 60 P. 2d 71 (1936) ; cf. State v. Palko, 122




The court in the instant case, in ruling on this point of law, has merely
restated a doctrine which has been accepted in North Carolina for over
a century, first pronounced in the case of State v. Stanton.'" This ruling is
supported by many opinions, and appears to be the better of the two con-
flicting views. As was said by Mr. Justice Peckham in Trono v. United
States:11 "When at his own request he has obtained a new trial he must
take the burden with the benefit, and go back for a new trial of the whole
case."
Mr. Justice Holmes would reject the waiver theory and explain on another
ground the holding that an accused can be convicted of a higher offense on
retrial. In his dissenting opinion in Kepner v., United States,'2 he declared
that putting the defendant on retrial because of a mistake of law does not
constitute double.-jeopardy at all, since a second trial in the same case must
be regarded as only a continuation of the jeopardy which began with the
trial below. While this view would seem, upon reflection, to be the most
desirable of the three discussed, it does not appear to have received much
support in the cases.' 3
CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY-SINGLE ACT CONSTITUTING
SEPARATE OFFENSES
Goods were shipped by two different owners through an interstate
trucking line. Appellant "hi-jacked" a truck containing both shipments, but"
was apprehended before he could unload it. He was convicted on separate.
counts for stealing the goods. Held, appellant was properly "coiivicted of
separate offenses; it was the intention of Congress, in enacting the National
Stolen Property Act,' to protect every interstate shipment of goods. Oddo v.
United States, 171 F. 2d. 854 (2d Cir. 1949).2
The reported case tends to add to the confusion surrounding an impor-
tant question in criminal pleading: whether a defendant may be convicted
of different offenses for stealing at the same time and place property owned
by different persons. The cases directly deciding the point are about equally
10. 23 N. C. 424 (1841).
11. 199 U. S. 521, 534, 26 Sup.Ct. 121, 50 L. Ed. 292 (1905).
12. 195 U. S. 100, 134, 24 Sup. Ct. 797, 49 L. Ed. 114 (1904).
13. In accord with Holmes' theory is State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 1110 (1894)
(appeal by the State in a criminal case).
1. "[W]hoever shall steal . . . from any truck ... with intent to convert to his
own use any goods or chattels moving as or which are a part of or which constitute an
interstate or foreign shipment of freight or express . . .shall in each case be fined not
more than $5,000.00, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both ... ." 37 STAT. 670
(1913), as amended, 18 U. S. C. A. § 409 (1940) [now Pub. L. No. 772, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess., §§ 659, 2117 (June 25, 1948)].
2. The facts are reported more fully in United States v. De Normand, 149 F. 2d
622 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 756 (1945).
1949 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
divided.3 Perhaps the majority of the cases hold only that the offenses may
be joined without duplicity. 4 In at least one jurisdiction, a plea of autrefois
coivict will bar a subsequent prosecution for theft of other property at the
same time and'place; while a plea of autrefois acquit will not.5
If the same transaction results in separate offenses, there is no good
reason for not punishing the offender by separate convictions. It has been
held that the test for determining identity of offenses is "whether the same
evidence is required to sustain them." 6 Its application brings divergent
results. If the property was taken by separate acts, clearly, different evidence
is required to find each taking. So, in United States v. Beerntal,
7 where the
defendant stole property of lodgers from five different rooms in a boarding
house, five convictions were held proper. But this case was disapproved in
Hoiles v. United States,8 and the latter was followed in Chanock v. United
States.9
Many other cases contain dicta to the effect that separate takings "at
the same time and place" result 'in only one offense.' 0 Although there are
separate trespasses as to the owners, there is said to be but one trespass as
to the state." The Missouri court has said that although different evidence
is required to prove each taking, the act, intent and volition are the same.
1 2
This does not appear to be realistic, since each taking must be a distinct act.
Some courts express the fear that, by splitting the offenses, the thief might
escape a penitentiary sentence,' 3 but there is no danger of this where the
state is given an election between one prosecution and several.'
4
The attitude of the Beerman case is that separate property rights have
been violated, and that the state should redress each wrong. While fully
protecting the defendant's rights, this view is more consistent with the
common law concept of larceny.
A more difficult question is presented when, as in the principal case,
the defendant has taken possession of the diversely owned property by a
3. See Note, 42 L. R. A. (N.s.) 967, 973 (1913). But cf. Note, 31 L. R. A. (N.s.)
693, 723 (1911) (majority rule said to be that separate offenses are committed); 22
C. J. S., Criminal Law § 298(c) (1940) (majority rule said to be that only one offense
is committed).
4. E.g., People v. Israel, 269 Ill. 284, 109 N. E. 969 (1915) ; State v. Douglas, 26
Nev. 196, 65 Pac. 802 (1901) ; State v. Hennessey, 23 Ohio St. 339 (1872).
5. Wright v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. App. 627, 40 S. W. 491 (1897).
6. Morgan v. Devine, 237 U. S. 632, 641, 35 Sup. Ct. 712, 59 L. Ed. 1153 (1915) ; cf.
United States v. Miro, 60 F. 2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1932) ; Reger v. Hudspeth, 103 F. 2d
825, 826 (10th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 549 (1939).
7. 24 Fed. Cas. 1065, No. 14,560 (C. C. D. C. 1838).
8. 3 MacArth. 370, 36 Am. Rep. 106 (D. C. 1877).
9. 267 Fed. 612 (D. C. Cir. 1920).
10. See, e.g., Furnace v. State, 153 Ind. 93, 54 N. E. 441 (1899) ; State v. Emery,
68 Vt. 109, 34 AtI. 432 (1896).
11. People v. Israel, 269 Ill. 284, 109 N. E. 969 (1915).
12. State v. Toombs, 326 Mo. 981, 34 S. W. 2d 61 (1930).
13. People v. Israel, 269 Ill. 284, 109 N. E. 969 (1915).
14. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 104 Mass. 552 (1870). But see Phillips v. State, 85
Tenn. 551, 558, 3 S. W. 434, 437 (1887).
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single act. Since larceny is an offense against possession, in its essence a
trespass,' 5 the fact of ownership is material only insofar as it is necessary
for description of the property taken. 16 And if chattels owned by different
persons are taken from a single possession, it would seem that only one
offense is committed in taking all. Often, the thief does not even know or
care who owns the property he is taking.17 The fact of ownership by several
different persons alters neither the moral nor the legal aspects of the wrong
done to the public.' s
The principal case seems to be based primarily on the National Stolen
Property Act. Undoubtedly, Congress may provide that one act may constitute
several distinct offenses.' 9 Theft of or from an interstate shipment is made
"in each case" punishable.20 Even if this construction is sound, the authority
of the case should be restricted to cases arising under the statute.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY-DEGREE
OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED
Plaintiffs licensed movie films to defendant exhibitors under a percentage
agreement, and they now seek to recover in a federal district court sums
allegedly withheld through systematic and continuous under-reporting of
ticket sales. Defendants put the jurisdictional amount in issue, whereupon
plaintiffs, unable to allege or show the exact amounts withheld, submitted
affidavits substantiating a reasonable belief that more than $3,000 was
involved.' Held, that plaintiffs had sustained their burden of showing that
jurisdiction was properly invoked. Columbia Pictures Corporation v. Rogers,
81 F. Supp. 580 (S. D. W. Va. 1949).
15. People v. Murphy, 47 Cal. 103 (1873); Hite v. State, 17 Tenn. 197 (1836);
Regina v. Gruncell, 9 Car. & P. 365, 173 Eng. Rep. 870 (N. P. 1840) ; Rex v. Walsh,
1 Moody 14, 168 Eng. Rep. 1166 (Crown Cas. 1824). It is larceny even if the owner
steals from a bailee. Palmer v. People, 10 Wend: 165 (N. Y. 1832).
16. State v. Mickel, 23 Utah 507, 65 Pac. 484 (1901).
17. Dean v. State, 9 Ga. App. 571, 71 S. E. 932 (1911).
18. See State v. Kieffer, 17 S. D. 67, 95 N. W. 289, 290 (1903).
19. Reynolds v. United States, 280 Fed. 1 (6th Cir. 1922), roodified, 282 Fed. 256
(6th Cir. 1922).
20. It will be interesting to observe what the court will do with a case in which
defendant has stolen different shipments of goods belonging to one'owner. This would seem
to present the question of the application of the statute distinct from the question here
discussed. Such a case would occur where defendant has stolen a truck containing ship-
ments by different consignors to one consignee under such circumstances that title
passes on delivery to the carrier. The decision would indicate clearly the grounds of the
decision in the principal case, either by distinguishing it or by citing it as authority.
1. The affidavits were those of a lawyer employed by plaintiffs and showed that
agents of affiant had observed specific instances of under-reporting, amounting in one
case to more than $350, in two others to more than $500, from which an inference
of a continuous practice resulting in defalcation in excess of $3,000 might reasonably be
drawn. The court met defendants' contention that such evidence was based on hearsay




The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited by Congress, 2 is strictly
construed, 3 and those invoking it must sufficiently state facts from which
that jurisdiction clearly appears.4 A general statement that the matter in
controversy is in excess of $3,000 constitutes a sufficient showing, unless
the defendant properly puts in issue the jurisdictional amount.5 Then the
burden is on the plaintiff to introduce proof of the existence of jurisdictional
facts.6 The mode of determining the issue of jurisdiction is within the
discretion of the court. 7 But the problem apparent in the present case, the
quantity and degree of proof the court should require, has been little discussed.
The decided cases, speaking in general terms, have set the requirement
variously.8 Plaintiffs in the present case urged the so-called "legal certainty"
rule that "it must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less
than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal," 9 while defendants
contended that the court must hear evidence and be satisfied, with plaintiffs
bearing the burden of proof, that the requisite jurisdictional facts are
present.10
It is submitted that the problem involved is the same as that confronting
any court required to make a preliminary finding of fact." The courts have
traditionally taken the view that what is required is a preponderance of the
evidence to satisfy the court,12 with an occasional relenting to permit a finding
based on only a prima facie case. 13 That there was no departure from the
traditional rule in the present case is apparent when one bears in mind the
fact to be found. The court was not required to find that the amount of
2. 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1948).
3. Thompson v. Gaskill, 315 U. S. 442, 62 Sup. Ct. 673, 86 L. Ed. 951 (1941); see
Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263, 270, 54 Sup. Ct. 700, 78 L. Ed. 1248 (1934).
4. E.g., McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U. S. 178, 56 Sup. Ct.
780, 80 L. Ed. 1135 (1936). The court must dismiss where it appears from the pleadings
that plaintiff could not recover in excess of $3,000, or where there is apparent colorable
exaggeration for the purpose of invoking jurisdiction. DOBIE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE 152
(1928).
5. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U. S. 66, 59 Sup. Ct. 725, 83 L. Ed. 1111 (1939); KVOS v.
Associated Press, 299 U. S. 269, 57 Sup. Ct. 197, 81 L. Ed. 183 (1936).
6. MONTGOMERY, MANUAL OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE § 100 (4th
ed. 1942).
7. E.g., Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U. S. 66, 59 Sup. Ct. 725, 83 L. Ed. 111 (1939).
8. Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939) (sub-
stantial proof) ; Buck v. Gallagher, 307 U. S. 95, 59 Sup. Ct. 740, 83 L. Ed. 1128 (1939) ;
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U. S. 178, 56 Sup. Ct. 780, 80 L, Ed.
1135 (1936) (preponderance of the evidence).
9. Saint Paul Indemnity Co. v. Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283, 289, 59 Sup. Ct. 586, 82 L. Ed.
845 (1938). A paraphrasing of the term defines it as that certainty required in a legal
-proceeding.
10. An analysis of these two contentions reveals that each aims at placing the risk
of non-persuasion on the adverse party.
11. For a "prefatory" discussion of this problem see MAGUIRE, EViDENCE: CoM~ioN
SENSE AND CoMMisoN LAw 211 et seq. (1947).
12. Id. at 212.
13. Scherf v. Szadeczky, 4 E. D. Smith 110 (N. Y. City Ct. 1855) ; Cardozo, J., in
'Clark v. United States, 289 U. S. 1, 14, 53 Sup. Ct. 465, 77 L. Ed. 993 (1933) ("There
must be a showing of 'a prima fade case sufficient to satisfy the 'judge that the light
should be let in").
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ultimate recovery would exceed $3,000, but only that the controversy or
dispute involved more than that amount. Hence the evidence to furnish
the basis of the finding need not have established losses in excess of $3,000,
but merely information warranting plaintiffs' belief in good faith 14 that with
the aid of discovery and inspection proceedings, defalcations exceeding that
amount might come to light. Therefore reports of specific instances of
under-reporting to the extent of more than $350 in one case and more than
$500 in two others, when thousands of films had been supplied, warranted
the court's finding that a bona fide dispute of the required magnitude was
sufficiently shown.
INSURANCE-INCONTESTABLE CLAUSE-EFFECT ON ACTION -BY
INSURER TO REFORM POLICY
In 1926 defendant applied to the complainant for an ordinary life
insurance policy. Through a clerical error he received a "Pension .Policy,"
entitling him to twice the benefits of the ordinary life policy. Yet the premium
inscribed on the issued policy, which was paid throughout the life of the policy,
was the amount required for an ordinary life policy and considerably less than
the "Pension Policy" premium. Becoming aware of the mistake in 1946,
the complainant sought a reformation of the policy, so that the benefits
acdruing to the defendant would not exceed those of the ordinary life policy.
Defendant's principal defense rested upon an incontestable' clause in the
issued policy. The trial court granted the reformation. Held (2-1),1 reversed;
an action for reformation is a contest within the conteinplation of the
incontestable clause. Richardson v. Travelers Insurance Co., 171 F. 2d 699
(9th Cir. 1949).
Since the turn of th& present century it has been customary for incon-
testable clauses to be inserted in life insurance policies. 2 They are intended
as an assurance that after a certain period, seldom more than two years, the
obligation of the insurer to pay on the maturity of the policiy will become
absolute.3 Originating as a voluntary inducement to prospective policy-
holders,4 they are now required in the majority of states by statute.5 The
14. For one legal writer's explanation of this good faith, see DOBIE, FEDERAL PRO-
cE-uRE 152 (1928).
1. Opinion by Orr, J. (Healy, J., concurring); Bone, J. dissenting without written
opinion.
2. On the history, purpose and scope of incontestable clauses, see Notes, 24 CALIF.
L. REV. 722 (1936), 31 ILL. L. REV. 769 (1937), 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 839 (1934).
3. Orr, J., in instant case, 171 F. 2d at 701. See also Note, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 722
(1936).
4. "It is generally agreed that the origin of the clause may be found in the competi-
tive idea of offering to policyholders assurance that their dependents would be the recipients
of a protective fund rather than a lawsuit." 171 F. Zd at 699. See also Wright v. Mutual
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courts have uniformly upheld the validity of such clauses where the policy is
stated to be incontestable after a year or longer.6 Where the incontestable
clause allows the insurer a reasonable time for discovery, it is held to exclude
as defenses not only inadvertent breaches of warranty and misrepresentations,1
but also fraud in the inception of the policy.8 Although there is a split of
authority on whether fraud is a defense to a policy declared incontestable from
date of issuance, the majority of courts have held even here that the clause
prevents such a defense.9
The cases have held that certain defenses are available to the insurer
after the incontestable clause has run. Thus, enumerated limitations on the
coverage or risk assumed by the insurer are generally treated as exceptions
and are held not to be affected by the clause.' 0 Also, a showing that suit was
not" brought or proof of death was not supplied within the time allowed by
the policy," and a denial that insurance was written on the insured's life
Benefit Life Ass'n, 118 N. Y. 237, 23 N. E. 186 (1890) ; Clement v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 101 Tenn. 22, 46 S. W. 561 (1898) ; VANCE, INsURANcE § 231 (2d ed. 1930).
5. The state statutes in point are summarized in Note, 31 ILL. L. REv. 769, 772 n. 14
(1937). It is there stated that 31 states have a statutory incontestable requirement for
life policies.
6. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Panagiotopoulos, 83 F. 2d 957 (1st Cir. 1936) ; Dibble
v. Reliance Life Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 170 Cal. 199, 149 Pac. 171 (1915) ; Drews v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 79 N. J. L. 398, 75 Atl. 167 (1910). See Notes, 85 A. L. R.
317 (1933), 98 A. L. R. 710 (1935), 135 A. L. R. 445 (1941), 147 A. L. R. 1015 (1943),
170 A. L. R. 1040 (1947).
7. One purpose of the incontestable clause is to prevent forfeiture for innocent mis-
take, and no cases have been found which have questioned its validity as applied to
misrepresentations of this type.
8. Dibble v. Reliance Life Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 170 Cal. 199, 149 Pac. 171 (1915);
Wright v. Mutual Benefit Life Ass'n, 118 N. Y. 237, 23 N. E. 186 (1890); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Peeler, 71 Okla. 238, 176 Pac. 939 (1918); Clement v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 101 Tenn. 22, 46 S. W. 561 (1898); Harrison v. Provident Relief Ass'n, 141
Va. 659, 126 S. E. 696 (1925).
9. The clause prevents the defense of fraud: Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Strange,
223 Ala. 226, 135 So. 477 (1931) (health policy) ; Duvall v. National Ins. Co. of Mon-
tana, 28 Idaho 356, 154 Pac. 632 (1916) ; McKendree v. Southern States Life Ins. Co.,
112 S. C. 335, 99 S. E. 806 (1919),; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Fox, 106 Tenn. 347,
61 S. W. 62 (1901).
The clause does not prevent the defense of fraud: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Weaver,
114 Ky. 295, 70 S. W. 628 (1902) ; Reagan v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Mass. 555,
76 N. E. 217 (1905) ; cf. Welch v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 108 Iowa 224, 78 N. W.
853 (1899).
10. Flannagan v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 22 F. 2d 136 (4th Cir. 1927)
(injuries received in driving while drunk) ; Sanders v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.,
10 F. 2d 143 (5th Cir. 1925) (injuries intentionally inflicted by a third party) ; Wright
v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 25 F. 2d 514 (E. D. S. C. 1927) (suicide) ; Lee v. Southern
Life & Health Ins. Co., 19 Ala. App. 535, 98 So. 696 (1924) (death by malicious act of
beneficiary); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. New, 125 La. 41, 51 So. 61 (1910) (adjustment
for misstatement of age) ; Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hartle, 165 Md. 120, 166 Atl.
614 (1933) (disability and double indemnity rider) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Con-
way; 252 N. Y. 449, 169 N. E. 642 (1930) (death while in aerial flight); American
National Ins. Co. v. Turner, 226 S. W. 487 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (death in military
service in time of war). Contra: Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Burgess, 18 F. 2d 599
(E. D. S. C. 1927) (suicide); Sun Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 108 Ky. 408, 56 S. W. 668
(1900) (death as the result of insured's own criminal act); Bernier v. Pacific Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 173 La. 1078, 139 So. 629 (1932) (death while in aerial flight).
11. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n v. Byassee, 169 Ark. 230, 275 S. W. 519 (1925);
Brady v. Prudential Ins. Co., 168 Pa. 645, 32 Atl. 102 (1895).
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because of a substitution during the medical examination 12 have been allowed
as valid defenses after the running of the incontestable clause. The courts
have also held that the clause does not preclude the insurer from defending
on the ground of no insurable interest '3 or because recovery would be in
contravention of a strong public policy.
14
In the principal case the court denied the insurer a policy reformation
sought on the ground of mutual mistake. The holding was based upon a
construction of the incontestable clause inconsistent with several prior
decisions.' 5 In construing the clause, "This contract shall be incontestable......
the court held that the phrase, "This contract," referred only to the printed
provisions appearing on the document of insurance.18 Yet the leading prior
case in point, Columbian Natirnal Life Insurance Co. v. Black,'17 construed
an equivalent term, "this policy," as it appeared in the'incontestable clause, to
mean the actual understanding between the parties as a result of oral conver-
sations and negotiations preliminary to the execution of the written instru-
ment.'8
Prior to the instant case, a suit for the reformation of a life insurance
policy was always held not to be a contest within the contemplation of incon-
testable clauses. 19 Two reasons can be offered why such an interpretation
of a suit for policy reformation may not appear too unjust to the insured.
12. Obartuch v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 114 F. 2d 873 (7th Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 312 U. S. 696 (1941); Maslin v. Columbian National Life Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp.
368 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
13. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hooker, 62 F. 2d 805 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 289
U. S. 748 (1933); Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. George, 248 Ala. 649, 28 So. 2d 910
(1947); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Masterson, 180 Ark. 170, 21 S. W. 2d 414 (1929);
Wharton v. Home Security Life Ins. Co., 206 N. C. 254, 173 S. E. 338 (1934). See also
Notes, 6 A. L. R. 452 (1920), 13 A. L. R. 675 (1921), 35 A, L. R. 1492 (1925), 170
A. L. R. 1046 (1947).
14. Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362, 23 Sup. Ct. 139, 47 L. Ed.
216 (1902) (insured executed for crime) ; Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Linson, 245 Ala.
493, 17 So. 2d 761 (1944) (murder of insured by beneficiary). Contra: Afro-American
Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 113 Fla. 158, 151 So. 405 k1933) (insured's execution for crime
held no bar to beneficiary's recovery).
15. Donnelly v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 59 F. 2d 46 (5th Cir. 1932), cert.
denied, 287 U. S. 638 (1932); Columbian National Life Ins. Co. v. Black, 35 F. 2d 571
(10th Cir. 1929); Mates v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 316 Mass. 303, 55 N. E. 2d
770 (1944); Equitable Life Assurance Society of 'the United States v. Rothstein, 122
N. J. Eq. 606, 195 Atl. 723 (1957), aff'd inee., 123 N. J. Eq. 591, 199 Atl. 43 (1938) ;
Buck v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States, 96 Wash. 683, 165 Pac. 878
(1917); see American Nat. Ins. -Co. v. McPhetridge, 28 Tenn. App. 145, 152, 187
S. W. 2d 640, 643 (E. S. 1945).
16. 171 F. 2d at 700.
17. 35 F. 2d 571 (10th Cir. 1929).
18. Id. at 577. The ambiguous phrases, "this contract" and "this policy," may have
any of three distinct connotations: (1) The acts of the parties; such acts and their effect
can be impeached by fraud, mistake and other congenital defenses. (2) The obligations
created by the acts of the parties; these include the intangible rights and duties as dis-
tinguished from the acts which created them. (3) The terms of the obligations; this
means the definition of the obligations as spelled out in the four corners of the issued
instrument. While the court in the principal case chose the third interpretation, it could
just as easily have chosen one of the other two.
19. Cases cited note 15 supra.
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First, before a court of equity will reform a policy, a mutual mistake must
be established by clear and convincing proof; no lesser quantum of proof
will be sufficient.20 Second, reformation will be allowed only when the insurer
is not guilty of laches, and when the insured has not changed his position
by reliance on the issued policy.21 Yet inasmuch as the incontestable clause
prevents an insurer from relying upon the defense of fraud after a stated
period of incontestability has expired, it would seem reasonable to hold, as
does the principal case, that an action for reformation on the ground of
mutual mistake is not excepted from the coverage of the incontestable clause.
LOTTERIES-SLOT MACHINES-FREE GAMES AS PROPERTY
OF VALUE
An electrically operated slot machine was found in the defendant's pool
room, and he was prosecuted under a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the
setting up of a lottery or other gaming device for money or other property
of value.1 The machine registered free games for a winning combination of
symbols but it did not reward the player with money or other tangible property.
Held, free games are "property of value" within the meaning of the lottery
statute, so that the machine constituted a lottery or gaming device. Common-
wealth v. Rivers, 82 N. E. 2d 216 (Mass. 1948).
. Ordinarily slot machines are not unlawful per se,2 although under some
statutes or ordinances all coin operated amusement devices are prohibited,
whether used for gambling or not.3 But such machines are generally made
illegal if operated as gambling devices.4 Various types of machines have been
developed in attempts to avoid anti-gambling provisions in constitutions,
statutes and ordinances and at the same time to offer enough inducement to
20. Snell v.'Insurance Co., 98 U. S. 85, 25 L. Ed. 52 (1878); Graves v. Boston
Marine Ins. Co., 2 Cranch 419, 2 L. Ed. 324 (U. S. 1805); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Wetzger, 167 Md. 27, 172 Atl. 610 (1934) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Street, 265 S. W.
397 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). See also Note, 125 A. L. R. 1058 (1940).121. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Street, 265 S. W. 397 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); cf.
McCuen v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 192 S. C. 38, 5 S. E. 2d 449 (1939).
1. MAss. ANN. LAws c. 271, § 7 (1933). 4
2. Stoutamire v. Pratt, 148 Fla. 725, 5 So. 2d 248 (1941) ; Kirk v. Morrison, 108
Fla. 144, 146 So. 215 (1933) ; King v. McCrory, 179 Miss. 162, 175 So. 193 (1937) ;
In re Mapakarakes, 169 Misc. 766, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 826 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Times Amuse-
ment Corp. v. Moss, 160 Misc. 930, 290 N. Y. Supp. 794 (Sup. Ct. 1936) ; Brafford v.
Calhoun, 72 Ohio App. 920, 51 N. E. 2d 920 (1943); Commonwealth v. Mihalow, 142
Pa. Super. 433, 16 A. 2d 656 (1940) ; Harvie v. Heise, 150 S. C. 277, 148 S. E. 66, 68
(1929).
3. Silfen v. Chicago, 299 Ill. App. 117, 19 N. E. 2d 640 (1939) ; Colbert v. Superior
Confection Co., 154 Okla. 28, 6 P. 2d 791 (1931); Couch v. State, 71 Okla. App. 223,
110 P. 2d 613 (1941).
4.- Steed v. State, 189 Ark. 389, 72 S. W. 2d 542 (1934) ; Kirk v. Morrison, 108 Fla.
144, 146 So. 215 (1933) ; People v. Wertheimer, 152 Misc. 733, 274 N. Y. Supp. 90 (City
Ct. 1934); Adams v. Antonio, 88 S. W. 2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Roberts v. Gos-
sett, 88 S. W. 2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
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make the operation of the machine profitable.5 The familiar "one-armed ban-
dits," when designed to pay off in actual money, have quite generally been
held to be illegal devices under these anti-gambling laws. 6 Alteration of the
machine to pay off in slugs or tokens, exchangeable for merchandise in some
cases but more often usable only for deposit in the machine to obtain some
form of amusement, has not changed the result in most cases.7 Machines
were devised to indicate to the operator in advance of play exactly what the
payoff on that play would be, in the hope that the courts would find no ele-
ment of chance remaining to make the machine illegal. The attempt failed, 8
the courts saying that the game consisted not of one play but of several and
that the element of chance lies in the uncertainty as to what the indicator will
show on the next play.9 Further attempts to evade the statutes included
machines which vended an unvarying piece of merchandise, such as candy
mints, on each play, and at irregular intervals produced slugs which could
be used to play the machine for amusement only. These have been declared
illegal in numerous decisions.10
The final step was to produce the type of machine involved in the instant
case, which rewarded the winning player with no tangible property but only
with a chance to play again." Under statutes which prohibit gambling gen-
5. "In no field of reprehensible endeavor has the ingenuity of man been more ex-
erted than in the invention of devices to comply with the letter, but to do violence to
the spirit and thwart the beneficent objects and purposes of the laws designed to suppress
the vice of gambling. Be it said to the credit of the expounders of the law .that such
fruits of inventive genius have been allowed by the courts to accomplish no greater result
than that of demonstrating the inaccuracy and insufficiency of some of the old definitions
of gambling that were made before the advent of the era of greatly expanded, diver-
sified, and cunning mechanical inventions." Moberly v. Deskin, 169 Mo. App. 672, 155
S. W. 842, 844 (1913).
6. People v. Kay, 38 Cal. App. 2d 759, 102 P. 2d 1110 (1940) ; Territory v. Jones,
14 N. M. 579, 99 Pac. 338 (1908); State v. Busch, 59 R. I. 382, 195 Atl. 487 (1937) ;
State v. Gaughan, 55 W. Va. 692, 48 S. E. 210 (1904) ; see Stewart v. State, 108 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 661, 2 S. W. 2d 440, 442 (1928) ; Berry v. State, 106 Tex. Crim. Rep. 657,
294 S. W. 216 (1927).
7. Boynton v. Ellis, 57 F. 2d 665 (10th Cir. 1932); Chambers v. Bachtel, 55 F.
2d 851 (5th Cir. 1932); Rankin v. Mills Novelty Co., 182 Ark. 561, 32 S. W. 2d 161
(1930); Commonwealth v. McClintock, 257 Mass. 431, 154 N. E. 264 (1926) ; Crippen
v. Mint Sales Co., 139 Miss. 87, 103 So. 503 (1925) ; People v. Kopper, 253 N. Y. 83,
170 N. E. 501 (1930); People v. Spitzig, 133 Misc. 508, 233 N. Y. Supp. 228 (Co. Ct.
1929); Snyder v. Alliance, 41 Ohio App. 48, 179 N. E. 426 (1931); Harvie v. Heise,
150 S. C. 277, 148 S. E. 66 (1929); Painter v. State, 163 Tenn. 627, 45 S. W. 2d 46
(1932).
8. Commonwealth v. McClintock, 257 Mass. 431, 154 N. E. 264 (1926); Crippen v.
Mint Sales Co., 139 Miss. 87, 103 So. 503 (1925); State v. Apodoca, 32 N. M. 80, 251
Pac. 389 (1926) ; State v. McTeer, 129 Tenn. 535, 167 S. W. 121 (1914).
9. "The chance of game from the second operation was the inducement. It was an
appeal to the gambling desire, a temptation to take the chance of gaining a substantial
prize by continuing to operate the machine." Commonwealth v. McClintock, 257 Mass.
431, 154 N. E. 264, 265 (1926).
10. Boynton v. Ellis, 57 F. 2d 665 (10th Cir. 1932); Howell v. State, 184 Ark. 109,
40 ,S. W. 2d 782 (1931); Rankin v. Mills Novelty Co., 182 Ark. 561, 32 S. W. 2d 161
(1930) ; State v. Mint Vending Machine, 85 N. H. 22, 154 At. 224 (1931) ; Painter v.
State, 163 Tenn. 627, 45 S. W. 2d 46 (1932).
11. Most such machines are of the pinball variety, but the result under any par-
ticular statute would seem to be the same, since pinball machines have quite generally
been held to be games' of chance, rather than skill. Howle v. Birmingham, 229 Ala. 666,
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erally without defining the term, the courts must consider common definitions
of gambling which require that money or some other valuable thing be played
for.' 2 It has been held that free amusement is such a thing.13 Often a statute
will particularize as to what things must be played for to constitute gambling, 14
and whether a particular machine is illegal under the statute often depends
upon whether free amusement is one of those things. Where the statute uses
such terms as "thing of value," "valuable thing," "property of value," and the
like, the tendency in the majority of the more recent cases seems to be that
free amusement comes within the meaning of such terms.15 The instant case is
an illustration of this tendency. Perhaps this represents a realization on the
part of the courts that the purpose of anti-gambling statutes can best be
served by prohibiting those devices which develop the gambling habit, even
though it may require stretching the words of the statute beyond their
literal meaning.
159 §o. 206 (1935) ; Sparks v. State, 48 Ga. App. 498, 173 S. E. 216 (1934); Common-
wealth v. Bowman, 267 Ky. 602, 102 S. W. 2d 382 (1937) ; State v. Barbee, 187 La. 529,
175 So. 50 (1937); Shapiro v. Moss, 245 App. Div. 835, 281 N. Y. Supp. 72 (2d
Dep't 1935); Milwaukee v. Burns, 225 Wis. 296, 274 N. W. 273 (1937); see Adams v.
Antonio, 88 S. W. 503, 505 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). But see Commonwealth v.
Mihalow, 142 Pa. Super. 433, 16 A. 2d 656, 658, 659 (1940). Some statutes make no
distinction between chance and skill: TEX. PEN. CODE. ANN. art. 619 (1938).
12. See Thrower v. State, 117 Ga. 753, 45 S. E. 126, 127 (1903) ; State v. Shaw,
39 Minn. 153, 39 N. W. 305, 307 (1888); State v. Grimes, 74 Minn. 257, 77 N. W.
4, 5 (1898); Proctor v. Territory, 18 Okla. 378, 92 Pac. 389, 390 (1907); Bell v.
State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509 (1857); State v. Smith, 10 Tenn. 272, 281 (1829).
13. State v. Wiley, 232 Iowa 443, 3 N. W. 2d 620 (1942); Oatman v. Davidson,
310 Mich. 57, 16 N. W. 2d 665 (1944); Alexander v. Martin, 192 S. C. 176, 6 S. E.
2d 20 (1939). Several courts have generalized by saying that the stake may be anything
that offers the necessary inducement to indulge the gambling instinct. See State v.
Mint Vending Machine, 85 N. H. 22, 154 Atl. 224 (1931); People v. Gravenhorst,
32 N. Y. S. 2d 760, 775 (City Ct. 1942) ; People v. Cerniglia, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 5, 7 (City
Ct. 1939); Painter v. State, 163 Tenn. 627, 632, 45 S. W. 2d 46, 47 (1932).
14. ARu. STAT. ANN. § 41-2003 (1948) ("property"); ILL. ANN. STAT., c. 38,
§ 341 (1935) ("other valuable thing"); MAss. ANN. LAWS, c. 271, § 7 (1933) ("prop-
erty of value"); N. Y. PENAL LAW § 982(2) ("thing of value"); N. D. REv. CODE
§ 12-2301 (1943) ("property"); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4604 (1931) ("property
of value!'); TENN. CODE ANN. § 11276 (Williams 1934) ("other valuable thing");
TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 619 (1938) ("anything of value"); MILWAUKEE CODE
§ 1069 (1914) ("other valuable thing").
15. Howell v. State, 184 Ark. 109, 40 S. W. 2d 782 (1931); Rankin v. Mills
Novelty Co., 182 Ark. 561, 32 S. W. 2d 161 (1930); Thamart v. Moline, 66 Idaho
110, 156 P. 2d 187 (1945); People v. One Pinball Machine, 316 Ill. App. 161, 44 N. E.
2d 950 (1942); State v. Mint Vending Machine, 85 N. H. 22, 154 AtI. 224 (1931);
Giomi v. Chase, 47 N. M. 22, 132 P. 2d 715 (1942); Heartley v. State, 178 Tenn. 254,
157 S. W. 2d 1 (1941); Painter v. State, 163 Tenn. 627, 45 S. W. 2d 46 (1932);
Martin v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. Rep. 313, 162 S. W. 2d 722 (1942); Broaddus v.
State, 141 Tex. Crim. Rep. 512, 150 S. W. 2d 247 (1941) ; "State v. Langford, 144 S. W.
2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). Contra: Davies v. Mills Novelty Co., 70 F. 2d 424, 426
(8th Cir. 1934); Mills Novelty Co. v. Farrell, 62 F. 2d 476, 478 (2nd Cir. 1933);
Gayer y. Whelan, 59 Cal. App. 2d 255, 138 P. 2d 763 (1943); In re Wigton, 151
Pa. Super. 337, 30 A. 2d 352 (1943).
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PERSONAL PROPERTY-NON-TRANSFERABLE WAR SAVINGS BONDS-
INTER VIVOS GIFT BY DELIVERY
Deceased, intending to make an inter vivos gift, delivered four Series E
war bonds to defendants. Under Treasury regulations these bonds were not
transferable.' Plaintiff, deceased's administrator, brought this action to recover
the bonds. Held, for plaintiff. Deceased had no power to transfer any interest
in the bonds except by cancellation and re-issuance; and, since no dominion
or control over the claim was surrendered to defendants, the gift was ineffec-
tive. Brown v. Vinson, 216 S. W. 2d 748 (Tenn. 1949).
When a commercial document representing a chose in action has been
delivered to the donee with donative intent, the attempted inter vivos gift is
generally given effect even though the claim cannot be enforced against the
obligor because of some defect in the assignment. 2 In such cases the donee
acquires equitable title to the claim.3 Regulations concerning the transfer of
United States bonds, however, are not enacted solely to protect the Govern-
ment from vexatious litigation; they also serve to make the bonds more
attractive to small investors by providing simple, uniform rules for the trans-
fer of interests in their proceeds. 4 With this in mind most courts have inter-
preted these regulations as a complete and binding legislative declaration of
all the rights, legal and equitable, which can be created in connection with
Series E bonds.5 This view is adopted by the Tennessee court in the instant
1. It was specified on each bond that "[tihis bond is not transferable; and . . .
is payable only to the registered owner." 216 S.,W. 2d at 749. Other regulations provide
for payment to creditors of a registered owner through judicial proceedings, but they
specifically refuse to recognize proceedings "which would give effect to an attempted
voluntary transfer inter vivos of the bond ... " 21 CODE FED. REas. § 351.51 (Cum.
Supp. 1944).
2. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 60 (1936); Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery
in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Documents, 21
ILL. L. REv. 341, 343-44 (1926). This seems to be the rule in Tennessee. In Nashville
Trust Co. v. Williams, 15 Tenn. App. 445 (M. S. 1932), a gift of life insurance by de-
livery of the policies without assignment was sustained. In McAdoo v. Dickson, 23 Tenn.
App. 74, 126 S. W. 2d 393 (W. S. 1938), delivery of unindorsed corporate stock was
held sufficient to complete a gift causa mortis. And in Dietzen v. American Trust and
Banking Co., 175 Tenn. 49, 131 S. W. 2d 69 (1939), the court gave effect to a gift causa
mortis made by mere delivery of non-transferable government bonds and postal savings
certificates. See 9 TENN. L. Ray. 113, 116 (1931).
3. E.g., Leyson v. Davis, 17 Mont. 220, 42 Pac. 775, 31 L. R. A. 429 (1895) ; Notes,
38 A. L. R, 1366 (1925) (stock), 84 A. L. R. 558, 566 (1933) (savings passbook) ; see,
Figuers v. Sherrell, 181 Tenn. 87, 93, 178 S. W. 2d 629, 631 (1944). By the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act § 9, 4 TENNr. CODE ANN. § 4103 (Williams 1942), delivery of shares
without indorsement but with intent to 'transfer imposes an obligation on the donor to
complete the transfer by indorsement, and this obligation may be specifically enforced.
4. And also, perhaps, to control inflation, to encourage thrift, and to give their holders
a greater stake in the government. See Moore's Administrator v. Marshall, 302 Ky. 729,
196 S. W. 2d 369, 372 (1946) ; Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Tezyk, 140 N. J. Eq. 474, 55
A. 2d 26, 28 (1947) ; In re Owens' Estate, 177 Misc. 1006, 32 N. Y. Supp. 2d 747 (1941);
61 HAuv. L. REV. 542 (1948).
5. Moore's Administrator v. Marshall, 302 Ky. 729, 196 S. W. 2d 369 (1946) ; Fidelity
Union Trust Co. v. Tezyk, 140 N. J. Eq. 475, 55 A. 2d 26, 28 (1947) ; Bergman v. Green-
wich Savings Bank, 74 N. Y. Supp. 2d 638 (City Ct. 1947); cf. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW
§ 24. Contra: Marshall v. Felker, 156 Fla. 476, 23 S. 2d 555 (1945) (gift effective be-
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case. 6 The problem is more fully treated in an earlier issue of this Review,7
discussing Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Tezyk,8 in which the New Jersey
court held ineffective an attempted gift causa mortis of similar bonds.9
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO MEMBER OF
PARTNERSHIP DIRECTING PRODUCTION OF PARTNERSHIP PA-
PERS-HELD VIOLATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Anti-trust Division of the Department of Justice caused a subpoena
duces tecum to be issued, directing one of the members of a partnership to
produce specified papers and communications belonging to the firm. The
undisputed purpose of the subpoena was to obtain evidence to be used against
all the partners. The other partners joined the subpoenaed'partner in a motion
to quash the subpoena on the ground that it violated their rights under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Held, motion granted. Only the subpoenaed
partner would be eligible to claim immunity under the Fifth Amendment, but
the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to all the partners, because
the subpoenaed papers are their private and personal, though common, prop-
erty. In re Subpoena. Duces Tecumn, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N. D. Cal. 1948).
An unreasonable search and seizure' does not require an actual entry into
a man's house or a forcible dispossession of his property.2 The essence of the
offense is the "invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, per-
sonal liberty and private property." 3 Thus, the compulsory production of
one's private papers by means of a subpoena duces tecum may constitute an
unreasonable search and seizure.4 The early case of Boyd v. United States5
tween donor and donee), criticized in 30 MARQ. L. REv. 208 (1946) ; cf. Katz v. Driscoll,
194 P. 2d 822 (Cal. App. 1948) (constructive trust imposed on beneficiary of bonds
bought by deceased in fraud of creditors) ; Dietzen v. American Trust & Banking Co.,
175 Tenn. 49, 131 S. W. 2d 69 (1939) (regulations not found to prohibit gift causa
mortis) ; see United States v. Sonnenberg, 158 F. 2d 911, 914 (3d Cir. 1946).
6. This is the primary basis of the decision. Although the opinion also states that the
gift was ineffective because deceased did not take all possible steps to surrender dominion
and control over the claim to defendants, 216 S. W. 2d at 749 and 751, the only real
reason no equitable title was transferred is that federal regulations expressly prohibit
such a transfer; thus the case is not in conflict with those cited in note 2 supra.
7. 1 VAND. L. REv. 318 (1948).
8. 140 N. J. Eq. 474, 55 A. 2d 26 (1947).
9. But cf. Dietzen v. American Trust & Banking Co., 175 Tenn. 49, 131 S. W. 2d
69 (1939)- (distinguished with some difficulty in the instant case).
1. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
.describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U. S.
CONST. AMEND. IV.
2. E.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1906);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886).
3. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886).
4. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1906); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886).
5. 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886).
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held that to compel an individual to produce his private papers or effects for
the purpose of obtaining ev idence to be used against him in a criminal case,
being violative of the Fifth Amendment, 6 also constitutes an unreasonable
search and seizure within the' meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A sub-
poena duces tecum ordering production of documentary evidence constitutes
an unreasonable search and seizure if "not properly limited in scope and in
proportion to the ends sought,7 or if invalidly issued.
8
But the right is personal and cannot be availed of by one whose property
interests have not been invaded, 9 regardless of whether the search or seizure
was reasonable or unreasonable.'0 A private corporation may invoke the aid
of the Fourth Amendment (though not the Fifth)" if the subpoena is un-
reasonable, i.e., too broad or too indefinite,12 or if it was invalidly issued.' 3
But an officer of the corporation cannot refuse t c produce corporate docu-
ments in his custody on the ground that his rights under the Fourth or Fifth
Amendments would be violated.14 This principle of non-protection has been
extended to apply to officers and members of unincorporated associations, 15
such as labor unions 16 and private trust organizations.
17
It would seem that all these cases raise two questions: (1) whether the
petitioners are eligible to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment
against invasion of their personal and private rights, and (2) whether
the subpoena was unreasonable. Both of these questions must be answered
in the affirmative if a claimant is to be granted relief under the Fourth
.Amendment. Cases concerning compulsory production of partnership docu-
ments are few.' s In the principal case the court disposed of the first question
6. "No person . . . shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be witness against
himself; . . ." U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V.
7. Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 31 Sup. Ct. 538, 55 L. Ed. 771 (1911);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1906); McMann v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 87 F. 2d 377 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, sub non.
McMann v. Engel, 301 U. S. 684 (1937).
8. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 40 Sup. Ct. 182, 64
L. Ed. 319 (1920).
9. E.g., Cravens v. United States, 62 F. 2d 261 (8th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289
U. S. 733 (1933) ; Shore v. United States, 49 F. 2d 519 (D. C. Cir. 1931), cert. denied,
283 U. S. 865 (1931); Kelleher v. United States, 35 F. 2d 877 (D. C. Cir. 1929).
10. It re Upham's Income Tax, 18 F. Supp. 737 (S. D. N. Y. 1937).
11. Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361; 31 Sup. Ct. 538, 55 L. Ed. 771 .(1911);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1906) ; see Note, 120
A. L. R. 1102 (1939).'
12. See note 7 supra; CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEizuRE 6 (2d ed. 1930).
13. See note 8 supra.
14. Lagow v. United States, 159 F. 2d 245 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U. S.
858 (1947) (where subpoenaed person was sole officer and shareholder of corporation) ;
Frankel v. United States, 65 F. 2d 289 (2d Cir. 1933) (contraband goods).
15. United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 64 Sup. Ct. 1248, 88 L. Ed. 1542 (1944) ;
see Note, 152 A. L. R. 1208 (1944).
16. United States v. White, supra note 15.
17. See United States v. Invader Oil Corp., 5 F. 2d 715, 717 (S. D. Cal. 1925);
Mulloney v. United States, 79 F. 2d 566, 577 (1st Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S.
658 (1936).
18. United States v. Brasley, 268 Fed. 59 (W. D. Pa. 1920); Lisansky v. United
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by reasoning that by the test set out in United States v. White0 the members
of a partnership, especially a small family partnership, are not disabled from
claiming the benefits of the Fourth Amendment. This refusal to extend the
principle of non-protection seems sound, because the papers of a partnership
represent the personal and private interests of its constituents. But the pro-
hibition of the Fourth Amendment applies only to unreasonable searches and
seizures.20 There was nothing to indicate that the subpoena was too broad or
too indefinite.21 It demanded the production of "certain specified records and
communications." 22 Nor did there appear to be any procedural defects in
the issuance of the subpoena. 23 The unreasonableness of the subpoena lies in
the fact that it was issued to compel the production of documents for the
purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in penal proceedings against the
joint owners and rightful 'possessors of those documents. Although the non-
subpoenaed partners could not themselves claim the protection of the Fifth
Amendment, nevertheless the language and spirit of the Boyd case unques-
tionably indicates that these partners were the victims of an unreasonable
search and seizure forbidden by the Fourth Amendment.
24
TORTS-ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE-HUM IN ELECTRIC WIRES AT TOP OF
TOWER HELD NOT WITHIN THE DOCTRINE
For several years defendant had maintained an uninsulated high voltage
electric line across a field owned by plaintiff's father. The steel tower bearing
States, 31 F. 2d 846 (4th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 279 U. S. 873 (1929); Haywood v.
United States, 268 Fed. 795 (7th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 256 U. S. 689 (1921);
Note, 1 VANn. L. Rav. 626, 628 (1948). The Brasley case is very similar to the principal
case, the only substantial difference being that in the former the subpoena was directed
to all the partners. The court held that their rights under both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments had been violated.
19. "The test . . . is whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a
particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its mem-
bership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private
or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group
interests only." 332 U. S. 694, 701, 64 Sup. Ct. 1248, 88 L. Ed. 1542 (1944). The court
was dealing particularly with the Fifth Amendment, but the language of the case
indicates that this test would be applicable as well with respect to the Fourth Amendment.
20. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925);
47 Abr. JuR., Searches and Seizures § 52 (1943).
21. See note 8 supra.
22. 81 F. Supp. at 419.
23. See note 9 supra.
24. The Fourth and Fifth, Amendments "throw great light on each other. For the
'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost
always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself,
which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man
'in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,' which is condemned in the Fifth
Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an 'unreasonable search and
seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Boyd v. United States, 116
U. S. 616, 633, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886). The Boyd case does not hold that
a person must be eligible to claim the benefit of the Fifth Amendment in order to be
able to invoke the aid of the Fourth Amendment where the unreasonableness of the
subpoena lies' only in the fact that it would compel him to give evidence against himself.
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the line had a ladder from the ground to the top, was not fenced off, and did
not have any warning signs about it. Plaintiff, a fourteen-year-old boy, heard
an unusual hum coming from transmission wires atop the tower and "decided
to climb the tower in order to play on the tower and to ascertain. why it was
making the noise." 1 He was shocked when he climbed up to or near the high
voltage wires by way of the ladder and sues for resulting injuries. Held, de-
murrer properly sustained. The case does not come within the attractive
nuisance doctrine inasmuch as the plaintiff 'was attracted, not to the t6wer, but
to the unusual hum the wires were making on this particular occasion. Gouger
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 216 S. W. 2d 739 (Tenn. 1949).
The attractive nuisance doctrine,2 sometimes called the "turntable doc-
trine," 3 is recognized today by nearly all American courts. There is much
variance, however, among the courts as to the extent of its application 4 and as
to the explanations given to justify its existence.5
The doctrine was developed through the fiction that the trespassing
child has an implied license or invitation to enter,6 or, as otherwise stated, he
has been allured or enticed onto the premises "as a bait attracts a fish or a
piece of stinking meat draws a dog." 7 A few jurisdictions have continued
to hold to the original fiction to the extent that they impose a requirement
that the "attractive" object be visible to and seen by the child from a point
where he is not a trespasser, and that it in fact lead or attract him onto the
1. 216 S. W. 2d at 739.
2. On the subject in general, see: BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 157, 190
(1926); 3 COOLEY, TORTS § 441 (4th ed. 1932); HARPER, TORTS §§ 93, 94 (1933) ;
PROSSER, TORTS 617 (1941) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 339 (1934); Green, Landowner v.
Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in Tort, 21 MIcH. L. REV.
495 (1923) ; Hudson, The Turntable Cases in the Federal Courts, 36 HARV. L. REv. 826
(1923); Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children- Entering Without Permission,
11 HARv. L. Rxv. 349, 434 (1898) ; Notes, 36 A. L. R. 34, 223, 267 (1925), 39 A. L. R.
486 (1925), 45 A. L. R. 982 (1926), 53 A. L. R. 1344 (1928). As to duty to guard
against danger to children by electric wires, see Notes, 17 A. L. R. 833 (1922), 41
A. L. R. 1337 (1926), 49 A. L. R. 1053 (1927), 100 A. L. R. 621 (1936).
3. So called because early cases arose out of injuries bn railway turntables. E.g.,
Sioux City & Pac. R. R. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 21 L. Ed. 745 (U. S. 1873); Keffe
v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry., 21 Minn. 207 (1875).
4. See Notes, 36 A. L. R. 34 (1925), 39 A. L. R. 486. (1925), 45 A. L. R. 982
(1926), 53 A. L. R. 1344 (1928) for an extensive collection of cases classified by
subjects and by states. The best statement of the rule yet made is that as to trespassing
children, the possessor of land owes a duty to exercise reasonable care where (1) the
trespass is foreseeable, (2) the condition of the premises should be recognized as involving
an unreasonable risk of harm to the child, (3) the child because of his immaturity
does not discover or appreciate the danger, and (4) the utility of maintaining the
condition is slight as compared to the risk. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 339 (1934).
5. "The decisions show an effort to hammer out a compromise between the interest
of society in preserving the Safety Qf its children and the legitimate interest of land-
owners to use their land for their own purposes with reasonable freedom, and so are
naturally in a state of flux and motion." BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAw OF TORTS 191
(1926).
6. E.g., McCulley v. Cherokee Amusement Co., 182 Tenn. 68, 184 S. W. 2d 170
(1944); 3 COOLEY, TORTS 202 (4th ed. 1932).
7. 1 TirompsoN, NEGLIGENCE 305 (1st ed. 1886), cited in PROSSER, TORTS 618 (1941);
United Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 275, 42 Sup. Ct. 299, 66 L. Ed.
615 (1922) ; Kelley v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 7 Tenn. App. 555, 559 (W. S. 1928).
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premises.8 The most famous application of this principle was made in United
Zinc & Chemical Co. v. BrittY Subsequently, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
in Kelley v. Tennessee Electric Power Co.,10 quoting with approval from the
Britt case," held a power company not liable for the death of an eleven-year-
old boy which occurred when he climbed one of its towers, on the ground
that he originally entered the company's right-of-way for the sole purpose
of using it as a short-cut, the tower not having induced the "trespass" in the
beginning.'
2
In the instant case, the court cited the Kelley case as being factually analo-
gous to the situation at hand,13 and reasoned that the tower was not an at-
tractive nuisance here since the plaintiff was not attracted by it, but by the
unusual humming of the wires on top of it.14 The analogy is hard to see.
8. United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 42 Sup. Ct. 299, 66 L. Ed.
615 (1922); Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Compton, 39 Ariz. 491, 8 P. 2d
249 (1932); Hayko v. Colorado & Utah Coal Co., 77 Colo. 143, 235 Pac. 373 (1925);
Smith v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 177 Iowa 243, 158 N. W. 546 (1916) ; Carr v. Oregon-
Washington R. R. & Nay. Co., 123 Ore. 259, 261 Pac. 899 (1927) ; Louisville & N. R. R.
v. Ray, 124 Tenn. 16, 134 S. W. 858 (1910) ; Kelley v. Tennessee Electric Power Co.,
7 Tenn. App. 555 (W. S. 1928). This principle has been rejected by the greater number
of courts, however, and is uniformly criticized by legal writers. "The better authorities
now agree that the element of 'attraction' is important only in so far as it may mean
that the trespass is to be anticipated, and that the basis of liability is merely the foresee-
ability of harm to the child, and considerations of common humanity and social policy
which curtail the defendant's privilege to use the land as he sees fit." PROSSER, TOR'rS
619 (1941); cf. REsTATEmENT, ToRTs § 339 (1934); Green, supra note 2; Gimmestad
v. Rose Bros. Co., 194 Minn. 531, 261 N. W. 194 (1935) (following the Restatement).
But cf. McCulley v. Cherokee Amusement Co., 182 Tenn. 68, 73, 184 S. W. 2d 170
(1944) (liability not rested upon humanitarian principles).
9. 258 U. S. 268, 42 Sup. Ct. 299, 66 L. Ed. 615 (1922). In an opinion by Mr.
Justice Holmes, the Court denied recovery because the child was not induced to trespass
by the presence of the pool of poisoned water which killed him, but discovered it only
after he had entered upon the land. "In the case at bar it is at least doubtful whether
the water could be seen from any place where the children lawfully were and there is
no evidence that it was what led them to enter the land. But that is necessary to start
the supposed duty." Id. at 275-76. The case has been the subject of much criticism. See,
e.g., HARPER, TORTS § 93 (1933); Note, 16 TENN. L. REV. 251, 252 (1940). The
Restatement treats the requirement as unnecessary; see § 339, comment a (1934).
10. 7 Tenn. App. 555 (W. S. 1928).
11. Id. at 559.
12. It is noteworthy that the doctrine, even with the qualification added by the
Britt case, would permit recovery in the situation involved in the Kelley case. For there,
in conformance with the doctrine so qualified, the little boy saw and was attracted to the
dangerous object (tower) from a point where he was not a trespasser-at least not
so far as the electric company was concerned. An electric company having a mere
easement over the land of a third person is not entitled to defend on the ground that
the plaintiff in such an action is a trespasser on real property. This principle, followed
by probably a majority of the courts at the present time, applies to adult trespassers as
well as to infants. Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 100 Vt. 414, 139 AtI.
440, 442 (1927), 26 MicH. L. Rav. 707 (1928), 12 MINN. L. REy. 420 (1928). Accord,
Birmingham Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Cockrum, 179 Ala. 372, 60 So. 304 (1912) ;
Nelson v. Branford Lighting & Water Co., 75 Conn. 548, 54 Atl. 303 (1903) ; Stedwell
v. Chicago, 297 Ill. 486, 130 N. E. 729 (1921); Lipovac v. Iowa Ry. & Light Co., 202
Iowa 517, 210 N. W. 573 (1926); Guinn v. Delaware & A. Telephone Co., 72 N. J. L.
276, 62 AtI. 412 (1905). See Notes, 77 U OF PA. L. REv. 506 (1929), 19 CORN. L. Q,
125 (1933), 14 A. L. R. 1023 (1921), 56 A. L. R. 1021 (1928).
13. 216 S. W. 2d at 740.
14. Cf. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Ray, 124 Tenn. 16, 134 S. W. 858 (1910) (no
liability where child climbed upon defendant's car to watch a boat unload, the boat
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It seems more reasonable to anticipate that a child would be attracted by a
tower making an unusual hum 5 than by a silent one. If it had been giving
off a strange glow about the top and plaintiff had investigated that, would he
be denied recovery just because he was attracted by the glow and not by the
"manner of its construction or its customary way of being maintained"? 16
The case seems made to order for the enticement fiction and for the doctrine
as qualified. The plaintiff had a lawful right to be where he was when he
first noticed the stiange noise coming from the wires atop the tower and
was thereby induced to commit his act of climbing the tower. From the first
he was induced to enter upon defendant's structure solely by the attraction
of the dangerous instrumentality maintained thereon-the humming electric
current. Quite the contrary was the situation in the Kelley case, for there the
child originally decided to trespass upon the land of the third party where
the electric company's tower was located for a reason entirely foreign
to the attractiveness of the dangerous instrumentality.
17
Even assuming the validity of the doctrine of the'Kelley case,' 8 therefore,
the court incorrectly used it as persuasive authority to hold as it did here,
being the attraction rather than the car) ; Erie R. R. v. Hilt, 247 U. S. 97, 38 Sup. Ct.
435, 62 L. Ed. 1003 (1918) (no "implied invitation" where injury incurred while reaching
under car to recover a toy); Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Compton, 39
Ariz. 491, 8 P. 2d 249 (1932), aff'd, 40 Ariz. 282, 11 P. 2d 839 (1932) and Salt River
Valley Users' Ass'n v. Green, 39 Ariz. 508, 8 P. 2d 255 (1932) (recovery denied where
child climbed electric company's pole to get a bird's nest, the pole not being the primary
attraction), criticized, 18 IowA L. REv. 286 (1933), 27 ILL. L. RaV. 459 (1932) ; Burns
v. Chicago, 338 Ill. 89, 169 N. E. 811 (1929) (doctrine held not to apply where boy
climbed pole as a result of a wager with his companions) ; Dennis' Adm'r v. Kentucky
& West Virginia Power Co., 258 Ky. 106, 79 S. W. 2d 377 (1935) (allegation that boy
was shocked and killed when he climbed tower built so as to attract children held not
to state a cause of action within the doctrine, there being no allegation that this character-
istic caused him to climb it, but rather that he climbed it to see football game in adjacent
field). But cf. O'Donnell v. Chicago, 289 Ill. App. 41, 6 N. E. 2d 449 (1937) (liability
under the doctrine where injury sustained in climbing pole near stadium to view boxing
matches, despite argument that the attraction was the boxing instead of the pole);
McKiddy v. Des Moines Elec. Co., 202 Iowa 225, 206 N. W. 815 (1926) (liability
under the doctrine when boy climbed pole to look up and down river); Znidersich v.
Minnesota Utilities Co., 155 Minn. 293, 193 N. W. 449 (1923) (liability under doctrine
where boy climbed pole on public highway to disengage kite).
15. Cf. Holbrook Light & Power Co. v. Gordon, 61 Ariz. 256, 148 P. 2d 360
(1944). There an eight-year-old boy playing near a transformer station was attracted
by its humming noise, and, the gates being padlocked, climbed a seven-foot mesh wire!
fence with sharp points on top to get inside, despite signs, "Danger-High Voltage,"
which he was able to read. With the help of companions he placed a heavy ladder found
inside so that he could climb up to a platform ten feet above the ground, where he was
injured by shock. The power company was held liable on the attractive nuisance theory,
the court stressing the ease and slight expense with which added safeguards could have
been maintained. As to the latter consideration, see Bauer, The Degree of Danger and
the Degree of Difficulty of Removal of the Danger as Factors in "Attractive Nuisance"
Cases, 18 MINN. L. REv. 523 (1934).
16. 216 S. W. 2d at 741.
17. Kelley v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 7 Tenn. App. 555, 563 (W. S. 1928).
18. See note 10 supra.
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since the two cases are clearly distinguishable upon their facts. It is possible,
however, that the result in the instant case can be justified on other grounds.
19
WILLS-RENUNCIATION OF LEGACY-POWER OF CREDITORS TO
ENJOIN RENUNCIATION BY INTENDED BENEFICIARY
A judgment debtor renounced a legacy ten months after the testatrix's
death. Shortly before the renunciation, and in connection with pending pro-
ceedings by the judgment creditor supplementary to the judgment, a court
order was issued forbidding the debtor from transferring or disposing of any
of his property. Held, that the long delay coupled with his conduct at an
examination in the supplementary proceedings constituted an acceptance of
the legacy as a matter of law. As an alternative ground the court held that
the judgment debtor had a property right in the bequest, at least from the
date of probate, and that the subsequent injunction prevented effective re-
nunciation. In re Wilson's Estate, 83 N. E. 2d 852 (N. Y. 1949).
On well-settled principles the right to accept or renounce a legacy or
devise is a personal one, and neither courts nor creditors have the power to
control the beneficiary's election.' In the absence of fraud or collusion it is not
material what the beneficiary's motives are in renouncing,2 and any un-
equivocal act on his part indicating a desire to renounce will be given effect 3
19. The court. might possibly have ruled as a matter of law that defendant was
not negligent in view of the fact that the tower was located in the country where the
presence of children was not to be readily anticipated; and, in view of the extreme
expense involved in constructing a fence around all of defendant's towers, it could
logically be h'eld as a matter of law that defendant was not negligent in failing to provide
that safeguard. The same might also be held in regard to the failure to erect warning
signs and to start the ladders above a child's reach from the ground, though this is
more doubtful. It is also possible that the court could find from the declaration as a matter
of law that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. These considerations may have
influenced the court in. reaching its decision, though they were not expressed in its
rationale. The court merely states, "This youth was familiar with this tower located
on his father's farm. That tower supported plainly visible wires commonly known to
be for the sole purpose of transmitting electricity in such quantity as to be instantly
fatal in most instances to anyone who make contact or near contact with them." 216
S. W. 2d at 741. On the contributory negligence aspect, see Whirley v. Whiteman, 38
Tenn. 343, 350 (1858); McCulley v. Cherokee Amusement Co., 182 Tenn. 68, 76, 184
S. W. 2d 170 (1944); Wallace v. Great Western Power Co. of California, 204 Calif.
15, 266 Pac. 281 (1928); Turner v. Texas Electric Service Co., 77 S. W. 2d 728 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1934).
1. Kearley v. Crawford, 112 Fla. 43, 151 So. 293 (1933) ; Watson v. Roberts, 108
Ind. App. 388, 26 N. E. 2d 75 (1940) ; Coomes v. Finegan, 233 Iowa 448, 7 N. W. 2d
729 (1943) ; Austin v. Collins, 317 Mo. 435, 297 S. W. 36 (1927) ; Bradford v. Calhoun,
120 Tenn. 53, 109 S. W. 502, 19 L. R. A. (N.S.) 595 (1908); Note, 133 A. L. R.
1428 (1941).
2. Goodsman v. Jannsen, 234 Iowa 925, 14 N. W. 2d 647 (1944) ; Coomes v. Finegan,
233 Iowa 448, 7 N. W. 2d 729 (1943) ; Pike County v. Sowards, 147 Ky. 37, 143 S. W.
745 (1912); Ohio National Bank of Columbus v. Miller, 57 N. E. 2d 717 (Ohio 1943);
Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S. W. 502, 19 L. R. A. (N.s.) 595 (1908).
3. Peter v. Peter, 343 11. 493, 175 N. E. 846, 75 A. L. R. 890 (1931) ; Goodsman
v. Jannsen, 234 Iowa 925, 14 N. W. 2d 647 (1944); Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556,
164 Pac. 1100 (1917) ; Perkins v. Isley, 224 N. C. 793, 32 S. E. 2d 588 (1945).
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if done within a reasonable time after the testator's death.4 Where the bene-
ficiary neither acceptst nor renounces the gift within such a reasonable time
his silence operates as an acceptance. 5 Delays of six,6 thirteen,7 and twenty 8
years have been held to be unreasonable, while periods of four days,9 six"
and sixteen" months have been found to be reasonable.
12
The alternative ground suggested by the court 13 represents a distinct
departure from traditional doctrine. In holding that the judgment debtor had
a property right upon which the restraining order operated, the court in fact
controlled the judgment debtor's election. There is ample authority to the
contrary,' 4 but very little to support such a proposition.15 The weight of
authority is that if a beneficiary renounces a legacy, the renunciation relates
back to the date of the deAth of the testator; and the beneficiary is treated as
though he had never received any property right or interest under the will.
16 .
4. "A gift or devise by which one's estate is materially increased naturally carries
a material benefit, and it is not human nature to refuse or reject such visitations of the
fickle goddess of fortune, and the law does not require such an absurd result to be
inferred or presumed. This being the sensible and practical presumption, it would
naturally be expected that if the devisee should desire to renounce he would do so at
least within a reasonable time." Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 164 Pac. 1100, 1102
(1917). See also Pournelle v. Baxter, 151 Fla. 32, 9 So. 2d 162 (1942); Seifner v.
Weller, 171 S. W. 2d 617 (Mo. 1943); Bacon v. Barber, 110 Vt. 280, 6 A. 2d 9, 123
A. L. R. 253 (1939).
5. See note 4 supra. "[T]he law presumes the acceptance by the testamentary donee
of a beneficial gift and this presumption is conclusive where the donee has had an oppor-
tunity to elect and has not rejected within a reasonable time." Pournelle v. Baxter, 151
Fla. 32, 9 So. 2d 162, 163 (1942); accord, Sanders v. Jones, 347 Mo. 255, 147 S. W.
2d 424 (1941) ; In re Howe's Estate, 112 N. J. Eq. 17, 163 Atl. 234 (1932).
6. Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 164 Pac. 1100 (1917).
7. Crumpler v. Barfield & Wilson Co., 114 Ga. 570, 40 S. E. 808 (1902).
8. McGivney v. McGivney, 142 Mass. 156, 7 N. E. 721 (1886).
9. Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S. W. 502, 19 L. R. A. (N.s.) 595 (1908).
10. Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N. W. 20, 27 A. L. R. 465 (1922).
11. Seifner v. Weller, 171 S. W. 2d 617 (Mo. 1943).
12. "The general principle is that an election must be made within a time that is
equitable in the light of all the circumstances. This time may be very long, if injury to
others will not result from the delay, and by the same token very short if the failure
to act promptly may work injury or hardship." Oliver v. Wells, 254 N. Y. 451, 173
N. E. 676, 679 (1930).
13. "It is sufficient in this case to say that the debtor had a property right in the
legacy, that he was enjoined from disposing of it.. . ." 83 N. E. 2d at 855.
14. E.g., Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N. W. 20, 27 A. L. R. 465
(1922); Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S. W. 502, 19 L. R. A. (N.s.) 595
(1908); see note 1 .spra.
15. In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P. 2d 401, 133 A. L. R. 1424 (1941);
Kearley v. Crawford, 112 Fla. 43, 151 So. 293 (1933) semble; see Bouse v. Hull, 168
Md. 1, 176 Atl. 645 (1935) ("If there is a substantial reason for the donee's conduct.
other than the unworthy object of baffling his creditor, as, for instance, when the legacy
or devise is coupled with a duty or obligation not incident to the bare absolute ownership
of property, a disclaimer ought to, and doubtless would, prevail; but if it is clear that
the donee, supposing him to be possessed of the average traits of humanity, would
accept for himself were he unobstructed and unprovoked by his creditor, and that he
is moved to disclaim by mere perverseness or passion, it would seem that the law ought
to overrule his election"); Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697, 707 (1879); Note, 43 YALE
L. J. 1030 (1934).
16. Goodsman v. Jannsen, 234 Iowa 925, 14 N. W. 2d 647 (1944); Coomes v.
Finegan, 233 Iowa 448, 7 N. W. 2d 729 (1943); Schoonover v. Osborne. 193 Iowa
-474, 187 N. W. 20, 27 A. L. R. 465 (1922);. Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 164 Pac.
1100 (1917); Albany Hospital v. Hanson, 214 N. Y. 435, 108 N. E. 812 (1915) ;
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It is this doctrine of "relation back" that prevents creditors from controlling
the debtor's interest in the gift. The principal case adopts a rule which in
essence prevents a beneficiary from renouncing even within a few day after
the will is probated, if his creditors diligently procure the necessary injunc-
tion. However, despite the language used by the court in the instant case,
1 7
the force of the holding that one may be enjoined from renouncing a bequest
because of a property right in it is weakened by the fact- that there is a strong
alternative basis for the decision.
WRONGFUL DEATH-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF BENEFICIARY-
MOTHER'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IMPUTED TO FATHER
A three-year-old child, left unattended in a bathroom by her mother,
fell into a bathtub containing hot water drawn by the mother, accidentally
turned on the hot water, and was scalded to death. Action was brought by the
child's parents under the wrongful death statute' against the defendant, from
whom the apartment was rented. For purposes of the case it was assumed that
the defendant was negligent in overheating the water, and the mother was
found to be contributorily negligent in leaving the child unattended in the
bathroom. 2 The father was guilty of no actual negligence. Held, that the
mother's negligence is imputable to her husband so as to bar all recovery.
Nichols v. Nashville Housing Authority, 216 S. W. 2d 694 (Tenn. 1949).
The courts have almost uniformly held that contributory negligence of
the deceased is a bar to recovery by the beneficiaries of a wrongful death
action,3 regardless of the type of statute involved ;4 but they have not been
in agreement as to the adequacy of the defense of contributory negligence
on the part of beneficiaries. 5 Disregarding the technical form of the statutes
Bradford v. Leake, 124 Tenn. 312, 137 S. W. 96 (1911); Bradford v. Calhoun, 120
Tenn. 53, 109 S. W. 502 (1908) ; 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1404 (Perm. ed. 1941).
17. See note 13 supra.
1. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8236, 8237, 8240 (Williams 1934).
2. The case was decided on a demurrer to the declaration, the court treating the
defendant as admitting its negligence in filing the demurrer. But the declaration was
found to state the mother's negligence as a matter of law, and the demurrer was
sustained. It is not within the scope of this discussion to consider the validity of the
holding that the mother was negligent as a matter of law.
3. TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL AcT § 66 (2d ed. 1913); HARPER, TORTS § 280
(1933) ; PROSSER, TORTS 966 (1941) ; RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 494 (1934).
4. Wrongful death statutes fall into two general classifications: those giving a new
cause of action to certain designated beneficiaries, and those merely preserving to the
administrator or to certain beneficiaries the cause of action the deceased would have
had if he had not died. Those giving a new cause of action, if strictly interpreted, would
exclude as a defense contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, in the absence
of an express provision for that defense. However, the courts in the few states which
have such statutes with no express provision for this defense have supplied it by judicial
construction. Wettach, Wrongful Death and Contributory Negligence, 16 N. C. L.
REv. 211, 215 (1938).
5. See Wettach, Wrongfid Death and Contributory Negligence, 16 N. C. L. REv.
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at times,6 they have divided into three main schools of thought. A small group
of courts holds that the contributory negligence of one beneficiary is im-
material and does not affect recovery.7 Taking the opposite viewpoint are a
few cases which hold that the contributory negligence of one beneficiary bars
all recovery, even if there are innocent beneficiaries.8
A majority of courts and legal scholars favor a mean between the ex-
tremes. It is their position that the contributory negligence of a sole bene-
ficiary, or of all the beneficiaries, bars all recovery ;10 but that where there are
innocent beneficiaries recovery is denied only to the extent of the negligent
party's interest." This position is consistent both with the theory that one
should not be allowed to recover for an injury to which his own negligence
was a contributing cause, and with the theory that an innocent person should
not suffer loss because of the negligence of another without receiving com-
pensation.
The Tennessee decisions seem to fall into this last mentioned category.
In Bamberger v. Citizens' Street R. R.12 the court held that the contributory
negligence of a father, through a custodian to whom he had intrusted his
daughter, barred all recovery, since he was the sole beneficiary of the death
action. In Anderson v. Memphis Street Ry.,' 3 where the mother of the de-
ceased was contributorily negligent but a sister who joined in the action was
entirely innocent, recovery .as denied to the mother but granted to the sister.
In the instant case the court recognized t-he holding of the Anderson case but
found that the relationship between the mother and the father in the care of a
child was such that the doctrine of respondeat superior should apply. Thus
the negligence of the mother was the negligence of the father. Since both
211, 219-31 (1938); Gilmore, Imputed Negligence, 1 Wis. L. REv. 193, 257, 259-73
(1921) ; Wigmore, Contributory Negligence of the Beneficiary as a Bar to an Admln-
istrator's Action for Death, 2 ILL. L. REv. 487 (1908) ; Notes, 70 U. S. L. REv. 502
(1936), 2 A. L. R. 2d 785 (1948); 17 B. U. L. REv. 429 (1937).
6. If the statutes were strictly interpreted in those states where the cause of action
of the deceased survives and passes to the administrator, the defense of contributory
negligence on the Dart of beneficiaries would not 'seem to be available. Wymore v.
Mahaska County, 78 Iowa 396, 43 N. W. 264, 6 L. R. A. 545, 16 Am. St. Rep. 449
(1889) (strict interpretation). But some courts with this type of statute have disregarded
this technicality. Note, 70 U. S. L. Rav. 502, 507-9 (1936).
7. E.g., Hines v. McCullers, 121 Miss. 666, 83 So. 734 (1920) ; see Note, 2 A. L. R.
2d 785, 795-99, 808-11 (1948).
8. E.g., Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Motor Bus Co., 310 Ill. 38, 141 N. E. 392,
30 A. L. R. 491 (1923) ; see Note, 2 A. L. R. 2d 785, 806-7 (1948).
9. PROSSER, TORTS 424 (1941) ; Wettach, Wrongful Death and Contributory Negli-
gence, 16 N. C. L. REv. 211, 225-29 (1938); Gilmore, Imputed Negligence, 1 Wis. L.
REv. 193, 257, 270-71 (1921) ; Wigmore, Contributory Negligence of the Beneficiary as
a Bar to an Administrator's Action for Death, 2 ILL. L. REv. 487, 493-95 (1908) ; Note,
70 U. S. L. REv. 502, 514-15 (1936).
10. E.g., Jenson v. Glemaker, 195 Minn. 556, 263 N. W. 624 (1935); see Note,
2 A. L. R. 2d 785, 788-95 (1948).
11. E.g., City of Danville v. Howard, 156 Va. 32, 157 S. E. 733 (1931); see Note,
2 A. L. R. 2d 785, 799-806 (1948).
12. 95 Tenn. 18, 31 S. W. 163, 28 L. R. A. 486, 49 Am. St. Rep. 909 (1895).
13. 143 Tenn, 216, 227 S. W. 39 (1921).
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beneficiaries were negligent there could be no recovery. The court recognized
that one parent is not necessarily the agent of the other in all dealings with
their child, but held that under the facts of this case a mutual agency ex-
isted.
14
The doctrine of imputed negligence has now been generally repudiated
(especially as to imputing negligence from bailor to bailee, from driver to
passenger, and from parent to child) ; but it is still applied in situations in-
volving a master-servant relationship, a joint enterprise, a partnership, and
other so-called agency relations.15 Most courts when faced with the problem
of the -instant case have failed to find such a relationship between parents
with respect to the care of a minor child that the negligence of one is im-
putable to the other.16 But a respectable minority, now joined by Tennessee,
have reached the opposite conclusion on the ground that there is such a mutual
agency between parents in the care of a minor child that the doctrine should
be retained and appliedY.
This view has much to justify it. Although each parent has a right and
a duty to care for the child it would seem that each also impliedly assents to
and authorizes the acts done by the other in the performance of that duty. 18
The relationship seems directly analogous to a partnership or a joint enter-
prise,19 and the fact that either party could act in his own right does not
preclude the existence of authority to act for the other at the same time. Had
the mother in the instant case exercised no control whatsoever over the
child, both parents might well have been found negligent in allowing the
14. The court cites and distinguishes Highland Coal and Lumber Co. v. Cravens,
8 Tenn. App. 419 (M. S. 1928), in which the negligent act of the father consisted in
securing unlawful employment for his son and was not an act growing out of the family
relation.
15. See PROSSER, TORTS § 55 (1941); Gilmore, Imputed Ncgligencc, 1 WIs. L. REV.
193, 237 (1921) ; Keeton, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 13 TEX. L. REV. 161 (1935).
16. Phillips v. Denver City Tramway, 53 Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460, Ann. Cas. 1914B,
29 (1912); White v. National Lead Co., 99 S. W. 2d '535 (Mo. App. 1937); Los
Angeles & S. L. R. R. v. Umbaugh, 61 Nev. 214, 123 P. 2d 224 (1942); Humphreys
v. Ash, 90 N. H. 223, 6 A. 2d 436 1939) ; Pearson v. National Manufacture & Stores
Corp., 219 N. C. 717, 14 S. E. 2d 811 (1941); MacDonald v. O'Reilly, 45 Ore. 589,
78 Pac. 753 (1904) ; Home v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 177 S. C. 461, 181 S. E. 642
(1935); City of Danville v. Howard, 156 Va. 32, 157 S. E. 733 (1931) ; Potts v. Union
Traction Co., 75 W. Va. 212, 83 S. E. 918 (1914).
17. Womack v. Preach, 64 Ariz. 61, 165 P. 2d 657 (1946); Agdeppa v. Glougie, 71
Cal. App. 2d 463, 162 P. 2d 944 (1945) ; Turner v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 106 Kan. 591,
189 Pac. 376 (1920); Burton v. Spurlock's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 336, 171 S. W. 2d 1012
(1943)'; Darbrinsky v. Pennsylvania Co., 248 Pa. 503, 94 Atl. 269, L. R. A. 1915E,
781 (1915) ; cf. Crevelli v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 98 Wash. 42, 167 Pac. 66, L. R. A.
1918A, 206 (1917) (similar result based on community property statutes).
18. See Darbrinsky v. Pennsylvania Co., 248 Pa. 503, 94 Atl. 269, 270, L. R. A.
1915E, 781 (1915).
19. It is generally stated that the existence of a joint enterprise requires a mutual
right to control and govern the movements and conduct of each other with respect to
a common purpose, in which all persons involved have a mutual interest. When such a
relation exists each party is charged with any negligence of another party to the enter-
prise in a matter involving the common purpose. PROSSER, TORTS § 65 (1941) ; 38 Am.
JUR., Negligence § 237 (1941) ; Note, 13 TEXAS L. REV. 161, 165 (1935).
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child access to a place of known danger;20 had the father entrusted the care of
the child to a servant he would have been charged with that person's negli-
gence.2' It does not seem reasonable then, that the father could by consenting
to the mother's exercise of exclusive control escape responsibility for her
negligence while acting in behalf of the family group.
20. Concerning the care required of parents for the safety of their children, see
38 Am. Jup., Negligence § 207 (1941);" Note, 16 L. R. A. .(.s.) 395 (1908).
21. Or suppose that a mother hired a nurse to care for her child under authority
from her husband. The father would be liable for the nurse's wages and chargeable with
her negligence in caring for the child. Why should not the father be charged with the
negligence of the mother if she did not hire a nurse?
